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 After Japan pragmatized bushido, or the samurai code, in the latter nineteenth century, it 
modernized into a nation-state and sought to extend that same methodology to its East Asian 
neighbors, China and Vietnam. Despite state-sponsored bushido’s success at home and cultural 
similarities with Asian peoples abroad, Japanese nation-state building failed in China and 
Vietnam. It was necessary for Wang Jingwei to preserve the nation congruent with Sun Yixian’s 
dreams of Chinese nationhood. Wang Jingwei prioritized rectifying internal strife to oppose both 
Western and Japanese incursions. Through a transnational lens the reasons for cooperation are 
unveiled and nationalist, intellectual exchange between Japan, China, and Vietnam recognized. 
For Wang’s China, Japanese partnership presented the most viable channel through which to 
attain self-determination. As a pragmatist seeking to preserve China’s national undertaking, 
Wang Jingwei adopted Japanese transnational narratives in 1940. Vietnam also adopted similar 
political, military, economic, and transnationalism models from Japan. Numerous Vietnamese 
elites like Bao Dai, Cuong De, and Ngo Dinh Diem, were educated in Japan and applied that 
country’s national rhetoric to their own. Vietnamese intellectuals and scholars found 
commutuality with their Japanese counterparts as educational exchange occurred during the early 
half of the twentieth century. Additionally, and much like Japan’s transnational experiment in 
China, Vietnamese nationalist groups fractured and not all fully aligned with Pan-Asianism. 
Educated elites and urbanites like the Dai Viet welcomed Japanese aid in severing ties with 
France. However, the majority rural population of Vietnam stood with Ho Chi Minh’s Viet Minh 
and learned military tactics from the Japanese, using them in the subsequent decades. Japanese 
nationalism and state-building succeeded in Japan but when applied transnationally from 1931-
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1945 and despite social, linguistic, and cultural similarities, Pan-Asianism failed in China and 
Vietnam due to differing historical experiences. 
 Was Pan-Asianism fully implemented as designed by Japanese architects? What were the 
repercussions of Pan-Asianism on nationalist movements in East Asia? Previous scholarship 
addressed these questions unfairly and critiqued Chinese and Vietnamese nationalists, who 
accepted Japanese aid, as “collaborators” or “traitors.” Additionally, historiography abruptly 
demarked Pan-Asianism’s demise at Japan’s surrender in 1945. Japanese nationalism and state-
building succeeded in Japan but when applied transnationally from 1931-1945 and despite social, 
linguistic, and cultural similarities, Pan-Asianism failed in China and Vietnam due to differing 
historical experiences. 
This is an intellectual history that comparatively analyzes rhetorical, cultural, political, 
educational, economic, and military exchange between Japan, China, and Vietnam. Furthermore, 
it is a new interpretation of Pan-Asian exchange during World War Two that utilizes a 
transnational lens. It relies on primary sources from Japan, China, Vietnam, Great Britain, 
France, the United States, and numerous other countries involved from 1931-1945. This does not 
simply employ sources from various countries but explains scholarly interchange and the 
formation of national narratives within East Asia. Moreover, secondary source references from 
previous scholarship establish a background and contribute a more rounded historical narrative. 
Despite cultural, linguistic, and social similarities between Japan, China, and Vietnam, 
Pan-Asianism was not effectively transplanted due to differing historical circumstances. The 
Japanese nation formed as a military culture and remained isolated from the seventeenth to 
nineteenth century. Japanese national-formation was juxtaposed to that of China and Vietnam, 
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both of which were subjected to external incursions, consisted of various ethnic groups, and had 
different dialects. Despite Japan’s failure in implementing Pan-Asianism directly, aspects of it 
survived World War Two into the Cold War in the form of post-colonial, nationalist movements 
in East Asia. This significantly contributes to historiography as a new, comparative study and 
intellectual history through a transnational lens.  
Literature Review/Historiography 
 Previous scholarship on this topic yields varied interpretations of Japanese occupation’s 
significance on China and Vietnam 1931-1945. Scholarly debate on the subject, and more 
specifically Japanese imperial influence on Chinese and Vietnamese nationalist movements, 
shifted to numerous foci including politics, nationalism, citizenship, narcotics-trade, tourism in 
the Empire, racism, ideology, and Confucianism. Prevalent consensus holds that Japanese 
occupation affected nationalist movements and Asian nationalism was presented a common 
enemy to unite against. Overall, most scholarship concentrated on the rest of Asia’s hatred and 
opposition to Japan,when in fact, many East Asian nationalists shared indistinguishable beliefs 
with Japanese intellectuals and politicians. Secondary sources reveal a narrative different from 
that of Wang’s government being labeled as traitors and Japan’s supposed flat effect on Vietnam. 
The concept of collaborationist nationalism for survival adds to the historical interpretation of 
this period 1931-1945. Vietnamese and Chinese nationalists utilized Japanese methods of 
national consolidation for pragmatic reasons. Many precepts of Japanese, transnational, Pan-
Asianism were mirrored by both Vietnamese and Chinese nationalists. Parallels between 
Japanese and East Asian transnationalism can be seen in similar rhetoric, whether politically, 
racially, culturally, or ideologically motivated. Though at odds, East Asian neighbors possessed 
similar written languages, common socio-ideological beliefs in Confucianism, resistance to a 
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broader enemy in Western encroachment, racial origins, common ancestry, and shared histories. 
The Japanese occupation had long-lasting effects on East Asia through all of the above-
mentioned commonalities coupled with adoption of Japanese structures. Although there are  
multitudes of sources available on this topic, none of them present a comprehensive 
interpretation of exactly how Japanese occupation affected Chinese and Vietnamese nationalism. 
Secondly, no known works utilize a transnational, case-study methodology to show why modern, 
Japanese nation-building worked for Japan and not for the rest of East Asia. Most scholarship 
only addresses separate pieces, i.e. political, social, and military. No mention has been found as 
to “why” or “how” Japan supported indigenous, Pan-Asian nationalists and why those 
nationalists  collaborated with  Japan.  
  Joseph Yick’s “Self-serving Collaboration: The Political Legacy of Madame Wang in 
Guangdong Province, 1940-1945,” addresses the political climate under Japanese 
occupation.Yick shows the close, working relationship between Japanese and Chinese 
politicians. His article also highlights the role of “Madame Wang” (Chen Bijun, Wang’s wife) 
and her political acumen within the Reorganized Government.   
 Continuing with Yick’s article and coinciding with political similarities between the 
Reorganized Government and the Japanese, Wai Chor So’s “Race, Culture and the Anglo-
American Powers: The Views of Chinese Collaborators” analyzed three points, as the title 
suggests, on race, culture, and Pan-Asianism. The author points to a dialogue from 1938-1940, 
between certain Chinese nationalists and their Japanese occupiers. Yick continuously indicated 
the multitude of similarities between Japanese and Chinese intellectuals on the question of 
nationalism. According to Wai, previously established racial sentiments observed by Chinese 
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collaborators reflected Japanese Pan-Asianism and that they readily adopted ideas from Japan for 
their own struggle.1  
 Coinciding with race and culture between China and Japan, Kenneth Rouff discusses 
Japanese tourism within the empire during World War Two in “Japanese Tourism to Mukden, 
Nanjing, and Qufu, 1938-1943.” Ruoff observes three different Chinese sites in which Japanese 
citizens toured. He explains the various ways in which educational exchange occurred between 
Japan and China, despite the ongoing war. Ruoff’s work on tourism illuminates a highly 
interesting aspect of the nationalist project in both countries. His work expounds on Japan’s 
preservation of Chinese history in an effort not only to claim as its own, but to renew Chinese 
nationalist sentiments against Western imperialism.  
 Several books and monographs show the confluence of Japanese and Chinese 
nationalisms. Nation Work: Asian Elites and National Identities highlights Japanese nationalist 
intentions within its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. A section of the book, as written 
and edited by Timothy Brook, concerns political approaches adopted by the Japanese towards 
war-torn China. In his essay, Brook acknowledges the contradictions between collaboration and 
nationalism; collaboration being the opposite of nationalism in that it sacrifices sovereignty. 
However, he later clarifies that pragmatic nationalism “in this twentieth century sense” is 
constructed entirely in nationalist terms.2 Also as Brook explains, “Nationalism was the boldest 
ideological claim that the collaborators made as to why they were working under Japanese 
tutelage.”3 As mentioned before, Japan attempted to reify Chinese culture through the 
                                                 
1
 Wai C. So, “Race, Culture, and the Anglo-American Powers: The Views of Chinese Collaborators,” Modern 
China, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Jan. 2011), 82. 
2
 Timothy Brook and Andre Schmid, “Collaborationist Nationalism in Occupied and Wartime China,” in Nation 
Work: Asian Elites and National Identities, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 162. 
3
 Brook and Schmid, 161.  
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sponsorship of Neo-Confucianism in Asia. As Brook points out, this is seen in Prince Konoe’s 
announcement of the New Order in East Asia which called for equal partnership between Japan 
and China and the acknowledgement of claims of Asian nationalism.4  
 Philip S. Jowett analyzes the ways in which Wang Jingwei’s nationalist army was 
composed on the Japanese military model. Rays of the Rising Sun: Armed Forces of Japan’s 
Asian Allies, 1931-1945, reminiscent of Joyce C. Lebra’s work, demonstrates the influence of 
Japanese military structure on Wang’s army.5 Jowett explains that Communist sources claimed 
most of Wang’s commanders were anti-communist rather than pro-Japanese. It was said the 
Japanese would arm the nationalist armies, Wang’s and Jiang’s, and they would be ready to deal 
with the Communists after the war.6 In this sense, it seems Wang applied the adage “the enemy 
of my enemy is my friend.” It only reiterates China’s need for survival and its congruent feelings 
towards communism, with the Japanese.  
The historiographical evolution of Japanese occupation’s effect on Vietnamese 
nationalism progressed in three stages, seemingly shaped by predispositions in relation to geo-
political currents during each phase of scholarship: 1) Vietnamese nationalism was an explicitly 
indigenous movement with no Japanese inspiration 2) Studies of Vietnamese nationalism 
switched  focus and acknowledged adaptations from the Japanese in military tactics and guerilla 
warfare 3) Interpretations showed an intricate dynamic between Vietnamese and Japanese brands 
of nationalism. Through a compilation of secondary sources, varied causes for nationalism’s 
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 Timothy Brook and Andre Schmid, “Collaborationist Nationalism in Occupied and Wartime China,” in Nation 
Work: Asian Elites and National Identities, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 177. 
5
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170. Lebra examines various armies trained by the Japanese which eventually led their countries’ national 
movments. 
6
 Phillip S. Jowett, Rays of the Rising Sun: Armed Forces of Japan’s Asian Allies 1931-1945, Vol. 1, China and 
Manchukuo, (Lancaster, England: Helion & Company Ltd., 2004.), 2436. 
vii 
 
ascent in Southeast Asia is apparent. Each historiographical phase provides a unique version of 
the rise of nationalism in Vietnam during the Second World War and exemplifies the shift in 
scholarly debate regarding the topic. A transition is evident as scholarship progressed from 
World War Two to the present. Scholars writing in the 1940s and directly following Japanese 
occupation, consisting of mainly Vietnamese authors, attributed nationalism to the organic 
growth of indigenous groups in search of self-determination. Japanese occupation is not credited 
as a catalyst for Vietnamese nationalism in early scholarship.7 Interpretations immediately 
following World War Two assume a negative tone when addressing Japan’s role in Southeast 
Asia. Vietnamese writers of Japanese occupation made a consensual effort to victimize Vietnam 
and villainize Japan. Japan is described as “fascist,” imperialistic and brutal. Tran Van Luan, a 
Vietnamese diplomat, and Tran Duc Thao a Marxist, denies any credit to the Japanese 
occupation and fomenting nationalist movements. Immediately after gaining independence, 
Vietnamese scholars did not want to attribute their newly-acquired liberation to the Japanese. As 
interpretation transitioned to the 1960s and 1970s, Japanese military tactics, strategy, guerilla 
and jungle warfare, and organization were recognized as inspiring the Viet Minh and other 
Vietnamese nationalist groups. During this period of scholarship, most works on the subject were 
written in English by American and British academics. When considering scholarship’s Western-
centric writing during this time, the subsequent focus on military tactics, and the influence of  
Japanese military administration on Vietnamese nationalists, it is comprehensible that the 
American experience in Vietnam had a profound effect on historical writing. This coincides with 
                                                 
7
See Tran Van Luan, “The Vietnam Struggle,” Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 2, No. 1 (March, 1949), 41; Tran Duc Thao, 
“Vietnam and Eastern Asia,” The Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4, (August, 1947), 409-410. 
viii 
 
the United States’ encounter with guerilla and jungle warfare against the North Vietnamese.8 
This altered course of research can be ascribed to the end of the Vietnam and Cold Wars. As 
hindsight took the forefront of American scholarship on Vietnam, explanation was needed as to 
why the United States failed to grasp victory in Vietnam. Becoming further removed from World 
War Two and coupled with the end of the Vietnam War, scholars in the 1980s-present shifted 
focus to the significance of Japanese intellectuals working with Vietnamese intellectuals, 
transplanting Japanese nationalism, and politico-military support for Vietnamese sovereignty.9 
Through careful interpretation of primary and secondary sources, a complex situation was 
apparent in Southeast Asia from 1940-1945. Sources vary amongst Americans, French, 
Vietnamese, British, and Japanese and illustrate a multifaceted historical account of the 
occupation. Allied perspectives demonstrated prejudices against Japanese war aims, French 
sources were skewed by the loss of their colonial foothold, Japanese versions paint a righteous 
portrait as the savior of East Asia, and Vietnamese sources are divided between supporting the 
Japanese, supporting the Allies, or simply maintaining sovereignty by any means. Multifarious 
depictions from newspapers, memoirs, official reports, periodicals, academic journals, and first-
hand recollections amalgamate into a whole historical narrative and represent multiple subjective 
truths as to how the Japanese occupation affected Vietnam’s national feeling and movements 
during World War Two. 
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Early Vietnamese scholars, like Tran Duc Thao, discounted Japan’s role in Southeast 
Asia and due to the previously mentioned historiographical trends in the late 1940s, the Japanese 
were not credited as influential for Vietnam’s national movements. “In Vietnam, the 
Japanese…failed to produce a single movement in favor of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere,” as stated by Tran Duc Thao.10 As research has progressed and shown, Tran Duc is 
simply a biased and inaccurate source. In fact, there were numerous nationalist groups that 
emerged under Japanese hegemony, forming in retaliation against or in support of the Japanese.  
Other scholars immediately after World War Two held similar notions. Tran Van Luan, a 
Vietnamese diplomat during the Second World War, parrots Tran Duc Thao in his conclusions.11 
He argues that Vietnamese nationalism and nationalist movements had no influence or direction 
from their Japanese occupiers is an outright omission of the complete narrative of this period. 
Vo Nguyen Giap, a former history teacher, learned general and tactician, and Ho Chi 
Minh’s right-hand-man in revolution, provides primary evidence that some Japanese Imperial 
soldiers aided the Vietnamese in their cause. He details encounters with Japanese officers after 
their defeat in August 1945 and there involvement with the Viet Minh’s training. 
Nguyen The Anh, a professor from the University of Hue, who lived through Japanese 
occupation, explained in his article “The Formulation of the National Discourse 1940-1945.” 
Nguyen unequivocally cites the Japanese as the stimulus and promoter of Vietnamese 
nationalism. Nguyen stands in opposition to earlier Vietnamese historians by acknowledging the 
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impact of the Japanese occupation on national feeling. Later Vietnamese scholars, unlike their 
Marxist predecessors, recognized the significance of the Japanese variety of nationalism on 
shaping Vietnamese nationalism. 
 Bui Diem was a Vietnamese student and clandestine member of the Dai Viet non-
communist, nationalist party during Japanese occupation. During the war he worked alongside 
Japanese cohorts against the French and coincidently studied under Vo Nguyen Giap in college 
while active in the Vietnamese nationalist movement.12 Bui was molded by and represented the 
relationship between Japanese and Vietnamese nationalists. 
Alan H. Brodrick’s Little China: The Annamese Lands, is an account of an Englishman 
questioning Vietnamese locals on their perceptions of Japan’s role in liberating East Asia from 
European colonialism.  
Despite only representing a portion of American perceptions, a New York Times article 
titled “Province Sliced from Indochina,” revealed that a significant number in the United States 
acknowledged Japan’s appeal in Asia. Numerous other Times articles during this period showed 
similar international perspectives on the situation in Vietnam from 1940-1945. Contemporary 
Japan, a periodical published in 1937, exemplifies the ideology of the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere in an article titled “The Fundamental Significance of Our Continental Policy.” 
It echoes much of what Japanese nationalists envisioned for their trans-nationalist mission to the 
rest of East Asia. 
Mamoru Shigemitsu provides a substantial account of the goals of the Japanese empire 
and their subsequent effect on Vietnamese nationalism. From the Manchurian Incident, which 
historians argue sparked the beginning of World War Two (1931) to Japanese surrender in 1945, 
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Shigemitsu served as foreign ambassador for Japan in multiple capacities throughout the war.13 
In his memoir of 1958, Japan and Her Destiny, he not only pens his thoughts and feelings about 
Japan during the war but more specifically, its nationalistic goals within the empire. 
Colonel Masanobu Tsuji narrates his memoir in Singapore, The Japanese Version, 
having several parallels to Shigemitsu. Tsuji was highly active with nationalist groups 
throughout Southeast Asia, during World War Two. He was operating in the region until the 
early 1960s and suspected of assisting the North Vietnamese government, even after Japan’s 
surrender on August 15, 1945.14 Tsuji characterizes the ends to which Japan facilitated various 
nationalist groups when he exclaims “With the help of a powerful Japan, the peoples of Asia will 
work together for independence.” 
Kiyoko Kurusu Nitz’s article “Independence Without Nationalists? The Japanese and 
Vietnamese Nationalism during the Japanese Period 1940-45,” demonstrates the various ways in 
which the Japanese and Vietnamese bonded before and during World War Two. She depicts 
Japan’s early fascination with Vietnam and the mutual feelings between the two countries. 
In her book titled Japanese Trained Armies in Southeast Asia, Joyce C. Lebra explains 
the ways in which Japanese military standards were implemented and influenced the formation 
of armies in Southeast Asia. Lebra addresses the Indian National Army, Burma National Army, 
and Vietnamese Army. 
From a British perspective, Louis Allen’s work War, Conflict, and Security in Japan and 
Asia Pacific 1941-1952 expounds on how the Japanese military motivated various Southeast 
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Asian national armies. Through his work, there is an obvious synthesis between the Japanese and 
Vietnamese from 1940-1945. 
Frederic Roustan, a French scholar emphasized the use of private and government-
sponsored Japanese research institutes in the pre-war years and during the war. 
Correspondent to Nitz’s work, Captain Patti Archimedes confirmed the diplomatic and 
political rapport between Japanese and Vietnamese nationalists. Archimedes was an O.S.S. 
(American Office of Strategic Services) operative in Vietnam, during World War Two. 
Accessible primary sources for this topic were biased as they were based on personal 
experience or connection to events. Other scholars utilized some of these sources before this 
work. However, none have looked at the question of Japan’s influence on East Asia through a 
transnational lens, using varied sources from different countries, languages, occupations, and 
peoples. Secondary sources, most of all previous scholarship, has not addressed Japan’s success 
with its own national mission and failure with its transnational one. Precedent discourse confined 
itself to only one perspective or attempted to place negative or positive value on events and 
people. That is not our job as historians. Historical work analyzes a variety of sources, from 
differing accounts, to portray a nuanced and whole picture. This research builds on previous 
scholarship and creates a new narrative through a transnational lens. 
Chapter Outline 
 This introduction “unpacks” and clearly defines terms like nationalism, modernity, Pan-
Asianism, and use of “collaboration.” It is necessary to delineate contested concepts and terms to 
aid in interpreting the argument. The introduction also outlines the scope of research and lenses 
used. This paper does acknowledge the bias of Western scholarship and applications of the term 
“nationalism” and “modernity” to Eastern history, as the two previously mentioned concepts are 
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Western constructs themselves. Explanation is also necessary for use of Pan-Asianism or Pan-
Asia. “Collaboration” is almost entirely synonymous with Chinese and Vietnamese nationalist 
groups who sought aid from Japan and this introduction elaborates on it and efforts to change the 
trajectory of scholarship’s use of such charged monikers. The introduction’s purpose is to help 
others navigate the research by defining intended use of the aforementioned terms.  
 Chapter one depicts the foundation of the modern Japanese nation-state. It addresses 
Japan’s preservation of the “samurai spirit” and bushido through the early to mid-twentieth 
century in order to mold a nation. The first chapter explains how Japan, having adopted Western 
technology and industrialization, re-branded them as their own and joined them with a re-
imagined history. The Japanese state promoted its narrative through universal education, 
adoration of the samurai, tourism, transnational exchange with Asian neighbors, and through 
glorification of East-Asian traditions in opposition to the West. Japanese nationalism developed 
into a transnational mission, or Pan-Asianism, and was dispersed to the rest of Asia either by 
colonialism or intellectual exchange.  
 Chapter two demonstrates the various ways in which Wang Jingwei and other Chinese 
nationalists adopted Japanese nation-state models to fulfill their own national conceptualization. 
Wang Jingwei’s Reorganized Nationalist Government, Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist 
Party, and Jiang Jieshi’s Goumindang are all utilized as a case study. It shows the educational 
impact of Pan-Asianism on not only Wang, but his nationalist predecessor Sun Yixian and other 
contemporaries. The second chapter explains that Pan-Asianism and Wang’s acceptance of 
Japanese aid was both pragmatic and necessary for China’s survival against Western incursions. 




 Chapter three is a case study of Vietnam’s experience with Japanese transnationalism 
during World War Two 1940-1945. It delves into the Vietnamese-Japanese relations, educational 
exchange, and occupation from the early twentieth century to the end of the war. More 
specifically, chapter three addresses the various Vietnamese nationalist factions that organized 
under Japanese occupation. It also depicts the similarities and differences between their 
platforms, ideologies, and socio-economic foundations in relation to Japanese influence.  
 The conclusion accounts for the case studies of Japan, China, and Vietnam and posits that 
Pan-Asianism ended with the defeat of Japan in World War Two. Japanese nationalism, and Pan-
Asianism, were both theoretically and practically successful in forming the modern Japanese 
state. It was not successful in China and Vietnam as Japan attempted to apply their nationalistic 
propaganda transnationally. However, its legacy remained during the Cold War and with post-
colonial movements throughout East and Southeast Asia. Although Japan successfully formed its 
own nation-state, it failed to propagate those same practices with their neighbors. Wang Jingwei 
arguably was not a collaborationist or traitor, but a pragmatist and simply another voice of 
Chinese nationalism from 1937-1945. Vietnamese nationalist parties, like the Dai Viet who 
accepted aid from Japanese contemporaries, were arguably not traitors. The conclusion also 
explains the significance of changing the way historiography references these players in writing, 
while avoiding a Japanese “apologist” stance. The conclusion of this thesis provides a greater 
historical understanding of not only transnational struggles, but also post-colonial movements 
after. It proves that yes, Japanese nationalism worked domestically but as it was disseminated 
across East Asia, it failed. Finally, it provides a new and different transnational perspective by 




Definitions, Language, and Lens 
  For this work, certain terms and parameters must be clearly defined. Nationalism is 
influenced by numerous Western scholars on the topic. Study of East Asian nationalism is an 
arduous task as most of the discourse on nations was established in the West. Despite my 
research, there is no apparent Asian nationalism outside of Western taxonomies. Therefore, most 
attempts to classify East Asian nations are distorted by Western definitions and assume an almost 
Orientalist spirit of which this research attempts to distance itself from. Scholars are left with a 
limited vocabulary to quantify other nations outside the West.  
 Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, and Steven Grosby are scholars on nationalism and 
have informed late scholarship on it. Possibly the most noted scholar on nations and their origin 
is Benedict Anderson. His two works Imagined Communities and The Spectre of Comparisons 
partially affected arguments made here. Anderson’s paradoxical evaluation of the nation as 
simultaneously tangible and intangible provided a nuanced interpretation for the field. The 
nation, as defined here, exists in the sense that people believe they are members of the nation but 
will never encounter most other members and yet sacrifice for those unknown members. 
Conversely, the nation is physically absent as one cannot simply “bottle” nation-ness. It exists 
solely in the consciousness of its members and is merely represented by symbols, idols, 
museums, and memorials, something of which will be later addressed, through tourism of the 
Greater East Asia Sphere. Universal education, which will be discussed with modernity later, 
propagates national feeling and pushes a national narrative derived from history and origin 
stories. Often, history is distorted to fit the national narrative, to imply that the nation has always 
existed and is still present and that students of the narrative belong to it.15  
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 Modernity is also an unwieldy term used haphazardly in historical writing. The concept 
itself derives from an upwardly-progressive, linear view of history that imagines itself either as 
currently “in modernity” or constantly striving for “modernity.” It has been visualized as the 
future as well as an industrialized, civilized, democratized present. But, what happens when we 
reach “modernity?” Is modernity enjoyed by everyone or do different groups have varying 
definitions of modernity? Is modernity mutually exclusive with the nation and does the nation 
exist without modernity? Specifically, for purposes of this work, Pan-Asia looked to Japan as 
exemplary of the modern nation-state. To free themselves from their colonial bondage, countries 
like China and Vietnam looked to adopt modern practices, similar to Japan, in order to achieve 
self-determination.  
 This quandary muddled research and poses a problem for conceptualizing Pan-Asianism. 
It becomes problematic when categorizing East Asian nations, like China, Japan, and Vietnam 
because not all interpretations of “modernity” apply to them. Like the nation and nationalism, 
modernity is also a Western construct. Both constructs pose the question: Can we apply Western 
concepts to interpret East Asian history? This research attempts to do just that and is not an effort 
to apply Western conceptualization to Eastern history, but an effort to utilize available 
vocabulary in presenting a uniquely East-Asian brand of nationalism, separate from the West.  
 Modernity is strictly defined and for purposes here, it is associated with industrialization, 
urbanization, universal education, a central state structure, and citizenship; Industrialization 
meaning stream-lined, mass production of commodities for domestic use and exports and 
technological advancements for the time period in which the thesis is centered (1937-1945); 
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Urbanization meaning at least fifty percent of the population lives in urban centers, apart from 
rural, agricultural areas; Universal education is available to all citizens of a nation in order to 
propagate national narratives and in an effort to create productive members of that nation while 
promoting a degree of upward mobility for a majority of the population; Centralized state 
structure meaning the power of one entity to govern its citizens and the sole right to violence and 
enforcement of laws; Citizenship meaning persons within clearly defined, geographical borders, 
possessing particular qualities that the state and society deem part of the whole, and subjection to 
a universal education system. These definitions serve to rectify any misconceptions about the use 
of “modernity” and are only defined as such for purposes of this argument. Modernity here is not 
constrained within or synonymous with a particular time frame, like the early to mid-twentieth 
century for example. Modernity here is also not mutually exclusive with nationalism or nations 
and is not a “zero-sum” requirement for the forming of nations. It is a unique set of 
circumstances under which some ethnic, linguistic, political, economic, or religious peoples 
experience.  
 The use of “nations” and “nationalism” also require delineation. The “nation,” as 
referenced hereto, is bound by geographical and political borders, and is comprised of citizens 
with common linguistic ties (derived from Chinese), social ideology (Confucianism), and history 
(centered around and permeating from China). “Nationalism,” as defined here, is a narrative that 
joins the “old” with the “new.” In the case of Japan, the infusion of bushido (of the old) and the 
nation-state (the new). Japan showed its continental neighbors that nation-building included 
fusion of the “old” and the “new.” 
 Pan-Asianism or Pan-Asia is based on the aforesaid definitions. Pan-Asia does not exist 
without Western incursions and colonialism. At its center, it took on an anti-West foundation and 
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sought to free other Asian peoples from Western oppression. It also included shared histories, 
social orders, and language with the continent’s cultural fore-bearer, China. Koreans, 
Vietnamese, Japanese, and Taiwanese commonly, if not begrudgingly, acknowledge the 
influence and cultural inheritance from China. Pan-Asianism is structured by Confucianism, 
relying on intermodal relationships. On a personal level, Confucianism asserts that self-
fulfillment emanates from the individual’s relationship with other people. This includes the 
execution of the individual’s proper role in relation to another person or performing duties for 
others. An example would be the relationship between a parent and child wherein certain 
obligations are expected between the two. Fei Xiaotong equates it to “circles that appear on the 
surface of a lake when a rock is thrown into it.”16 Within Pan-Asianism, these differential modes 
of association are applied to nations. Up to the nineteenth century, China was widely considered 
a “paternal nation” to the rest of East Asia. Japan, in fomenting the idea of Pan-Asia, assumed 
the paternal role after its own ascension and China’s descension.  
 With this relationship in mind and having established the framework of Pan-Asianism, 
Wang Jingwei’s “collaborative” government was not as history has so simply and bluntly labeled 
it as. Historiography’s consensus on coining Wang’s Reorganized Nationalist Government as 
collaborationist, or himself as a traitor, is rudimentary and lacks nuance. This research 
contributes to historical writing on this topic and presents another perspective; a transnational 
perspective that views Chinese and Vietnamese adoption of Japanese nation-building as a 
“pragmatic” path towards self-determination. As will be discussed throughout, Wang was the 
rightful heir to Sun Yixian, as himself and others attested. Sun Yixian and Wang Jingwei both 
studied in Japan and associated with the Genyosha society, taking from their education a 
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common cause in Pan-Asianism. Wang and Sun both called on their fellow countrymen to learn 
from the Japanese state, adopt new, modern methods while still valuing pastoral ways. If then 
both national leaders used the same rhetoric to mobilize Chinese nationalism, how is it Wang 
Jingwei was labeled a traitor by history and Sun Yixian hailed as a “George Washingtonesque” 
figure for Chinese nationalist movements? The answers lay in historical circumstances that 
Wang Jingwei found himself and his government in, during its tenure and after. Mao Zedong and 
Jiang Jieshi both opposed Wang’s government as it accepted Japanese aid. However, just like 
Japan itself, governments that accepted Japanese aid and entered Pan-Asia crumbled after 
Japan’s defeat in 1945. Plainly stated, Wang Jingwei lost, and the victor’s historical accounts 
quickly denounced his nationalist cause. The victory of the Chinese Communist Party over the 
Guomindang in 1949, further cemented Wang as a traitor to China.17 Conversely, other historical 
perspectives will continue to view Wang and other’s actions as treasonous and incongruent with 
Chinese or Vietnamese nationalism; that is a valid stance and this author does not seek to 
disprove it. Rather a peripheral goal is to dissuade the use of “collaboration,” “traitor,” or other 
emotionally-negative connotations when recounting this history.  
 Iris Chang’s The Rape of Nanking placed invaluable focus on Japanese military atrocities, 
exposing the horrifying and evil side of the Japanese empire. Historians must not ignore the 
system of “comfort women,” in which hundreds of thousands of women from Japanese colonies 
were forced into sexual slavery. It is an undeniably terrible disservice for this period in history to 
glaze over the mass murder, rape, and pillaging of Nanking by the Japanese. It is also impossible 
to dismiss the use of “comfort women” and the physical and psychological damage to not only 
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individual women, but to generations of Japan’s neighbors up to present. The objective view of 
transnational exchange of ideas between Chinese and Japanese nationalists acknowledges 
atrocious acts committed by the Japanese from 1937-1945. It is not intended to continue the 
“Second Rape of Nanking” propagated by some Japanese academics recently.18 This work looks 
at language, rhetoric, ideas, and nation-state building as Chinese and Vietnamese nationalists 
pragmatically adopted Japanese methods for their own vision. 
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Chapter One:  
Japanese Nation-State, Bushido, and Pan-Asianism (1868-1945) 
 Understanding Japanese nation-building as adopted by China and Vietnam necessitates a 
background of the modern Japanese state’s formation. As Japan modernized during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, other burgeoning nations readily adopted Japanese 
modes in forming their own tools of the state.1 During and after the Meiji Restoration 1868, the 
Japanese state summoned the way of the samurai or bushido in every facet of its establishment. 
On an ethical and philosophical level, bushido stems from several sources including Shintoism, 
Buddhism, and Confucianism. The samurai code derives its respect for nature and the role of 
humans within nature from Shintoism. It also emphasizes ancestors, deities, and gods of nature. 
This translates into respect for one’s lord and the natural order of service. Buddhism is also 
significant in bushido with a belief in reincarnation, the pursuit of perfection, and enlightenment. 
Both Shintoism and Buddhism dovetail with Confucianism that institutes an ordered society in 
which each person is to fulfill their given task in life and justifies what the West considers social 
inequality. Conversely, ideological offshoots of Confucianism, like bushido, evolved as 
something not only Japanese, but uniquely East Asian. Japanese military models employed 
bushido as an overarching ideological framework while transforming citizen soldiers into 
“samurai” as the physical manifestation of a feudal past and national pride.  This is the manner in 
which nations revise narratives, by assembling piecemeal historical artifacts of the past in order 
to make the people feel as one and identify with the nation.2 Juxtaposed to modern Japanese 
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“samurai,” the samurai class of pre-modern Japan was not made of the peasantry but of upper-
middle class, landed, professional warriors.  
 The samurai class emerged during Japan’s Nara period, starting in 710 CE.3  The  
samurai’s original duty was fighting off the indigenous Ainu people, in service to the Imperial 
Court. After establishing a bureaucracy, the emperor granted the defenders parcels of land. Land 
was a common form of payment and used for rice farming, thus turning a profit and providing 
subsistence. Eventually landowners who employed samurai became very wealthy and held vast 
expanses of land. These landowners, also of the samurai class, wereknown as daimyo. Often, 
daimyo waged war against other daimyo in pursuit of land and resources. Daimyo employed 
samurai to fight their wars. A hierarchy of vassalship developed and as samurai successfully 
served their lords, they too gained land. Eventually, conflict between the various lords and 
families peaked during the Sengoku Period (end of the fifteenth century to the beginning of the 
seventeenth century).4 This century-long civil war saw the use of samurai on a large scale, more 
so than ever before. Warlords fielded armies of samurai and bushi (common soldiers), 
numbering in the tens of thousands in the pursuit of land, resources, the imperial title of Shogun 
(supreme military ruler), and unification of Japan.  
 The Sengoku Period ended in 1603 when Ieyasu Tokugawa defeated and subjugated all 
other warlords in Japan. It was during the end of this period that the samurai class shifted its 
focus and skills. As the need for warriors declined, the samurai were forced to apply their skills 
elsewhere. Many opened businesses and pumped capital into the country which resulted in an 
economic boom. Others secluded themselves, opening up martial arts academies and reflected on 
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the philosophical aspect of the samurai class. During the Tokugawa Shogunate’s reign, the 
codification of bushido began with the works of Yamamoto Tsunetomo and Miyamoto Musashi. 
Treatises like Hagakure and the Book of Five Rings influenced the Japanese people for 
generations.5 However, a gap existed between post-Sengoku Japan and modern Japan of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As Japan industrialized, modernized, and formed a new 
government, the state required concepts that were essentially Japanese. Thus, numerous works 
like those of Musashi and Tsunetomo, gained popularity and inspired contemporary authors to 
publish works on the  “mythological warriors of old.” Bushido, in  its modern manifestation, was 
a distortion of something that never evidently existed. The authentic samurai class ruled Japan 
for over a millennium, but never tangibly codified a liturgy or ideology. The most significant 
works on the topic were not by samurai, excluding perhaps Miyamoto Musashi, but by authors 
belonging to the samurai class.  The modern Japanese state borrowed from antiquity a code that 
held little pragmatic purpose during the high-point of the samurai, which thrived during war. The 
Japanese state embraced an ideology born not from war, combat, and professional soldiers, but 
from a sedentary class of people who shifted to purposes other than war; Meaning the ideology 
on which the modern Japanese state founded itself derived from a samurai class of the post-
warring states era, who had no more purpose for war or had not engaged in war during their 
lifetime.6 Bushido, as imagined by Japanese national narratives, was a code born between the 
seventeenth and late nineteenth centuries in a period of peace. The state-adopted ideology of 
bushido had never witnessed war as did the samurai of which it romanticized.  
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 Coinciding with the modern Japanese state’s distortion of bushido, the state’s rendering 
of all Imperial soldiers as “samurai,” although symbolically utilitarian for the state, was a 
historical fallacy. As mentioned before, the samurai were a rich, landed caste in pre-modern (pre-
Meiji Restoration, 1868) Japan, far from the conscripted peasants of the modern Japanese 
military. Reshaping the Japanese nation-state through the military involved a disproportionate 
application of samurai ethics and distorted the true essence of bushido. Modern conscripts 
carrying the samurai sword into battle would have been cut down by their pre-modern 
countrymen, as no one other than samurai could carry the sword.7 To further explain this, the 
modern Japanese army was conscripted from the peasantry and lower classes with officers 
coming from the middle and upper classes. Samurai belonged to a distinct, exclusive class of 
feudal Japan and were the sole “carriers of two swords.” A modern, peasant conscript or middle-
class officer carrying the sword, the symbol and life of the samurai, contradicts the historical 
essence of the Confucian, societal order of Japan-past.  
 Nonetheless, bushido was a tool for the Japanese military and they indoctrinated a strong 
fighting force at a young age. The seven tenets of bushido- justice, courage, benevolence, 
politeness, veracity, honor, and loyalty- were borrowed by the Japanese government. This is 
evident in the Ministry of War’s 1871 instructions to soldiers as it repeated these same virtues as 
those of a soldier in service to the emperor.8 Militarists like Yamagata Aritomo required the 
samurai tradition to bolster a sense of nationalism. Youths around the country organized and 
conducted community service projects to make their emperor proud.9 Japan conscripted young 
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males at the age of fifteen years and four months and trained them until they were seventeen 
years old. During the Sengoku period samurai males of fifteen years received their first steel 
sword as a rite of passage. The education system was crucial in solidifying samurai tradition for 
the Japanese people. As militarists gained power in government, the curriculum for students 
shifted to glorification of the Japanese Empire and exemplary heroes that had fought in its 
various wars of conquest. As early as the first grade, textbooks contained lessons with content 
from the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) like this excerpt from a schoolbook referencing a 
Japanese victory over Russian forces, “Our brave officers and men resolved to repay His 
Majesty’s benevolence…and finally seized Hill 203.”10 As the Japanese school curriculum 
indicated, veneration of samurai esprit de corps further cemented that ideology at an early age 
and produced duty-minded young citizens. 
 Japanese conscripts were inculcated from a young age and it carried through to military 
service. Within the Japanese military model, there existed a hierarchy of power, much like that 
observed respectively between the sartorial ranks shogun, daimyo, and samurai. With a basis in 
Confucianism, bushido as adopted by Japan relied on paternalistic power roles. In modern Japan, 
the emperor was considered the patriarchal leader of the state and officers in the military fulfilled 
similar roles amongst their soldiers. Much of the Japanese army and navy codes originate in the 
Hagakure, a philosophical work by Yamamoto Tsunetomo from the early eighteenth century. A 
samurai himself, Tsunetomo compiled a series of conversations that addressed samurai lifestyle, 
beliefs, and conduct. As previously noted, this code constituted seven virtues (righteousness, 
courage, benevolence, respect, honesty, honor, and loyalty).11 “I have found the essence of 
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Bushido: to die,” was a repeating theme of Hagakure as well as the mantra of the Japanese 
fighting spirit.12 Service and absolute fealty to one’s lord was  prioritized in ancient Japan and 
subsequently so for the foot-soldier in service to country and the emperor. The relationship of 
foot-soldier to emperor reified the past; A filial relation that adapted from a samurai’s loyalty to 
his lord. Yamamoto Tsunetomo’s work was first widely-published in 1906 and according to 
Minoru Tanaka of Osaka University, “influenced generals and officers in military power.”13 
Many soldiers rationalized their actions during World War Two based on Hagakure and bushido. 
Not only did the Imperial Army summon the spirit of Yamamoto, but so did Japanese pilots 
carrying out kamikaze attacks. Pilots, seamen, and soldiers alike were young men indoctrinated 
by a school system that emphasized self-sacrifice and devotion to the Japanese nation-state.14  
 Additionally, bushido as adopted by the modern Japanese state was evident in military 
training, instruction, operation, and command structure. State bushido’s implementation required 
indoctrinating men at an early age. From the time they were in school and well into basic 
training, youths were strictly obedient to superiors and officers. Disobedience or insubordination 
from a soldier resulted in severe punishment or beating. Military policy dictated “calculated 
brutality” and effective officers were expected to beat their soldiers regularly.15 Harsh 
punishment instilled soldiers with fear so they would not think twice when given a mission. 
Echoing the spirit of Hagakure, officers ensured their men awoke each morning as if they were 
already dead. Fighting to the last man and seppuku cemented soldiers’ unquestioned loyalty to 
their officers and nation. An excerpt from the 1944 Japanese military handbook, “The 
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determination of the Japanese soldier is to fight to the last man or commit suicide, rather than 
surrender,” reiterates the influence of samurai tradition.16 Japanese Officers were so relentless 
towards those under their command that many soldiers feared returning to their officers if a task 
was not completed.  Young soldiers who showed cowardice in service to the emperor not only 
faced death or serious disciplinary action, but their families also received retribution. Punishing a 
soldier’s family mirrored a Tokugawa Shogunate (1603-1869) policy in which samurai who 
dishonored their lord were punished along with five generations of their family. Punitive action 
towards a soldier’s family was also consistent with societal retribution commonly observed in 
Confucian-based societies; If an individual acted dishonorably, the individual’s differential 
modes of association, family or friends, were also affected.17 
 Ritual suicide, often distorted and romanticized by western scholars, was linked to 
bushido in the Japanese military. Kamikaze attacks commenced during the final, desperate stages 
of World War Two. Exhausted of its resources, manpower, and suffering multiple defeats dealt 
by the United States, the Japanese employed a despondent tactic.  From a utilitarian perspective, 
these were not intentionally suicide missions, but simply not equipped for a return flight. 
Logistically, as Japanese resources hemorrhaged, they could not fully fuel and equip all planes 
for return after a mission.18 Vice-Admiral Takijiro Onishi was the first to conceive a kamikaze-
specific fighting force, known as the Special Attack Unit, strictly utilizing the Zero aircraft. The 
Zero was preferred for its maneuverability, speed, and ability to carry a 500-pound bomb. Faced 
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with deteriorating circumstances in the latter half of 1944, Onishi effectively implemented 
“suicide bombings” in desperation. “Even to the pilots who had fought against overwhelming 
odds, the request for kamikaze attacks was not received without shock.”19 Despite initial shock 
from the admiral’s request for suicidal missions, all pilots unanimously agreed to carry them out. 
 Conversely, total dedication to country and emperor was instilled in twentieth century 
Japanese pilots as it was instilled in sixteenth century samurai warriors. Japanese officers 
Masatake Okumiya and Jiro Horikoshi’s book Zero: The Story of Japan’s Air War in the Pacific, 
confirms their dedication:  
The human element of course contributed much to the final decision. Members of the 
Army and Navy had been raised in an environment startlingly different from that of our 
enemies. The time-honored custom and sentiment of the Japanese people would not 
recognize existence as a prisoner of war; capture by the enemy was to be feared more 
than death, for such capture was always accompanied by disgrace to one’s family…20  
 
  Soldiers did not return without completing a mission. Nor did they surrender as to not 
bring shame upon their families. Being taken as a prisoner of war was incomprehensible. 
Japanese soldiers, racially indoctrinated against the West during youth, whole-heartedly believed 
that if captured, no mercy would be shown them. Under the doctrine of bushido, they expected 
no mercy with surrender and had no respect for the enemy who surrendered to them. The 
Japanese military’s demeanor and reverence for samurai tradition near war’s end is apparent in 
Zero, “Rather than surrender to the enemy and spend a life in shame…our men naturally 
considered…means of achieving an honorable and glorious death”21 
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 Ritual suicide and kamikaze were not exclusive to the Japanese Air Force. Roughly 
100,000 Japanese soldiers defended Japan’s last hope in the spring of 1945 as the United States 
honed in on Okinawa island. The island of Okinawa was crucial for the United States military to 
launch an invasion of Japan. It provided a closer base of operations from which the American air 
force could launch bombing raids on mainland Japan. However, the Japanese were defeated 
when faced with American military might. Despite being holed up inside Shuri Castle, a feudal 
era fortress, General Mitsuru Ushijima’s defensive strategy failed and “…the Japanese 
commander committed suicide, and so did thousands of his soldiers and the civilians of the 
island.”22 Rather than face dishonorable capture by the enemy, the Japanese soldiers committed 
suicide.  
 Samurai traditions were influential from an economic standpoint as well. Beginning in 
the Meiji period, both the Japanese government and military supported the Zaibatsu until the end 
of World War Two. Former samurai families like Mitsubishi, belonged to a group of 
manufacturers and industrialists known as the Zaibatsu. During World War Two, Mitsubishi 
produced fighter planes known as “Zeros.” These were one of many types of planes used in the 
attack on Pearl Harbor and throughout the war. Many renowned Japanese motor vehicle 
companies, like Nissan, Suzuki, Kawasaki, Honda, Toyota, and Mitsubishi originated from 
Zaibatsu monopolies. These companies cornered the Japanese market on mining, chemicals, and 
metal production and gained exclusive contracts with the government and military. Whereas 
smaller, private, Japanese companies failed 
 The planes produced by the Mitsubishi Corporation not only carried a samurai name, but 
were used in kamikaze attacks. Literally translated as “divine wind” kamikaze alluded to an 
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attempted Mongolian invasion of Japan in 1281. As the Mongolian fleet approached the shores 
of Kyushu, the southernmost of Japan’s four main islands, typhoons swept across the Sea of 
Japan and destroyed Kublai Khan’s fleet. The small number of samurai that defended the 
shoreline attributed the good fortune to the gods.23 Herein lies  a mistakenly romanticized 
connotation with kamikaze. The invocation of “divine wind” was an appeal to samurai history 
and suicide missions were not originally intended by the Japanese military.  
 Samurai tradition also symbolically affected the Japanese military. The army and navy 
were immersed in samurai symbolism and nostalgia. The two largest battleships, the Yamato and 
Musashi, were respectively named after an ancient samurai family and the greatest swordsman in 
the world. Military implements like the battleships Yamato and Musashi did not simply resonate 
the past but naming them after historically significant figures legitimized the state’s power and 
extended the Japanese national narrative to the minds of all Japanese. Accompanying that, 
officers displayed samurai swords when in uniform. In numerous photographs, Admiral Isoroku 
Yamamoto, the strategist behind the Pearl Harbor attack, is accompanied with his officers aboard 
the battleship Yamato and all wore samurai swords, or katana..24 Many officer’s swords were 
handed down from generations of samurai families. The sword acted as more of an aesthetic 
piece rather than a practical sidearm. Nonetheless it showed traditional influence and a present 
manifestation of an imagined past. The katana saw significant use during the “Rape of Nanjing” 
in 1937, when Japanese forces captured the Republic of China’s capital and killed an estimated 
300,000 Chinese. One account is of two Japanese officers that competed for decapitating the 
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most Chinese, with their swords.25 In the latter years of World War Two, kamikaze pilots 
followed rituals before their final mission. This consisted of a large farewell meal, usually of 
rice, beans, and dried fish. Pilots then wrote a closing letter to their families and took three drinks 
of sake, bowed in thanks to the emperor, then to their fellow pilots, and finally in the direction of 
their hometown. With the letters, pilots sent their families ceremonial samurai swords, wrapped 
in silk, indicating their ultimate sacrifice to Japan.  
 The modern Japanese state invoked pastoral narratives and merged its feudal history with 
its present feeling of one-ness. In the conscript’s minds, they bravely charged into battle as 
samurai, in defense of their emperor and homeland. The samurai, once an elite class of Japanese 
society, became each citizen that served the nation-state in its endeavors. Japanese patriotism 
rallied national consolidation and was defined by filial service to Emperor, countrymen, and 
nation. It copied interpretations of the past in bushido, distorting historical ideology for present 
circumstance. Universal, bushido-based military education and glorification of the greatness of 
Japan-past created a modern military structure not seen in East Asia. As Chinese, Vietnamese, 
and other Asian nationalists flocked to Tokyo in the early twentieth century, so too did they 
acquire an admiration for Japanese state-building. Conflict between the Guomindang, Chinese 
Communist Party, and Japanese Imperial Forces alerted Wang’s need for a Reorganized National 
Army and government. Aspects of Wang Jingwei’s nationalism by preservation required a strong 
state and respectively a modernized military. Therefore, the Reorganized Government sought 
Japan’s aid to build its “enforcement arm,” in pursuit of Wang Jingwei’s nationalist agenda. 
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Pan-Asianism: Japan’s Transnational Mission  
 As Japan modernized and formed a nation-state, it relied on scholarship to justify 
imperial expansion across Asia. Pan-Asian concepts became the island nation’s ethos for 
“saving” East Asia and validating its imperial aspirations. Pan-Asianism derived from three 
factors; Primarily, Pan-Asianism developed in reaction to and in opposition of the West. The 
West (Great Britain, France, Germany, Netherlands, and the United States) gradually whittled 
East Asian sovereignty with imperialistic impunity. Japan borrowed Western-style technology, 
political structures, universal education, military structures, and manufacturing methods and 
merged them with its own history to form a nation-state. Japan modernized, rivaled Western 
supremacy, and thereafter imagined the West as an enemy to mobilize against.  
 Secondarily and concurrent with opposition to the West, Japan perceived the rest of East 
Asia to be culturally deteriorated. As Western imperialism colonized parts of China and all of 
Vietnam, so too did they colonize those cultures. Essentially East Asian traditions, like 
Confucianism, Chinese-based writing systems and languages, scholarship, similar ethnic 
heritage, and Confucian-based social structures were diluted by Western colonization. As such, 
Japanese scholars and nationalists professed Japan’s duty to preserve East Asian traditions in a 
paternalistic fashion. This was especially apparent after Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese 
War 1904-1905.26 As the only nation to defeat a Western power and preserve its East Asian 
traditions, Japanese colonial theorists believed in Japan’s obligation to liberate its neighbors 
from Western domination.27 Japan, like its Western imperial competition, endeavored on a 
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“civilizing” mission to separate their neighbors from the barbarians and align them within a 
Greater East Asia Sphere.  
 Thirdly, Japan rode on its success as an imperial power and nation-state. Nationalists 
attributed that success to modernization merged with a reimagined history. Modernization 
coupled with Japanese state-building was vital to combatting the West. Equally important, Pan-
Asianism mandated that the remainder of East Asia followed Japanese patterns to self-
determination. Japan introduced universal education, replaced pictographic language systems 
with alphabetical ones, established infrastructure, invested in indigenous manufacturing, and 
trained indigenous militaries within Pan-Asia. Its transnational objective was to unite Japan’s 
neighbors into a semi-homogenous front to preserve East Asian culture, modernize, and expel 
the West.    
Since its conceptualization in 1905, theoretical Pan-Asianism differed from its practice 
abroad.28 Policy implementation did not always align with ideological aims. Over Pan-
Asianism’s discourse, opinions between liberal scholars and conservative militarists varied and 
distorted this transnational concept. Essentially, Pan-Asianism dissented between its ideas and its 
implementation.  
The Japanese government relied on scholars, academics, and intellectuals to formulate its 
colonial policy. After gaining control of territories, whether for economic necessity or high-
minded reasoning, Japanese officials required justification to present to the world stage. 
Victorious against Russia in 1905, Japanese colonial theorists presented new ideas on colonial 
policy and Japan’s mission in East Asia. New founded confidence from the Russo-Japanese War 
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allowed academia free reign to define Japan’s new role and shape the minds of the nation, the 
empire, and the people under their influence. The new objective, which evolved into Pan-Asia, 
elevated Japan’s parity with Western imperial powers.29 
From academia, Pan-Asianism aspired to colonial progress instead of assertive 
braggadocio like that of its Western contemporaries. Inazo Nitobe, professor at Todai University, 
stressed benevolence and civilized governance of Japan’s colonies. A known humanist, Nitobe 
expresses “If we treat the peoples of these areas harshly; if we are unfair to the whites in 
commercial rivalry; if, in competing with Chinese labor, we treat the Chinese badly; if, in a 
word, we neglect humanitarianism, then our great mission will have little success.”30 Japan’s 
early policy theorists and architects emphasized compassion and altruism towards the indigenous 
peoples they colonized as it was crucial to Pan-Asianism. Nitobe continues: 
What is vital in any colonial scheme seems to me to be the right answer to this question: 
Do we govern an unwilling people for their sake or for our own? As to the general 
unwillingness of any colony to be governed by a power alien to it, there is little doubt. A 
colonial government has received no consent from the governed. Nor is there much 
reason to believe that a colonial power…bears the sacrifice simply to better the lot of the 
people placed in its charge. The history of colonization is the history of national egotism. 
But even egotism can attain its end by following the simple law of human intercourse- 
“give and take.” Mutual advantage must be the rule.31 
 
Inazo Nitobe’s works on Japanese colonialism perfectly exemplify policy-makers’ visions in 
formulating Pan-Asianism. Imperial Japan, perceived from Japanese scholars, learned from 
Western colonization to avoid oppression of indigenous peoples in its transnational efforts. On 
the policy building side, it was detrimental to the Japanese nation to commit atrocities against 
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and totally subjugate the colonized. Ex-bureaucrat Mochiji Rokusaburo characterizes policy-
makers colonial fears as he stated, “Those who bear heavy responsibility for public government 
in the colonies must keep this ever in mind; if they do not, the progress of Japan as a civilized 
nation will be jeopardized.”32 Despite atrocities committed during the Second World War, the 
original architects of Pan-Asianism were sincerely apprehensive about colonial goals and desired 
to hold Japan’s imperial project to a more compassionate standard than their European 
counterparts.  
 Other policy-makers and scholars debated the extent to which two different cultures 
could coexist under one government. For many early Pan-Asianists, differing historical 
experiences were considered when forming policy. Coincidingly, transnational harmony required 
a sort of one-ness; One language, one race, one belief, one emperor. As such, Japanese think-
tanks and academia stressed assimilation of indigenous populations into the empire. Much of this 
was racially based and rhetorically pitted “Pan-Asians” against Westerners. A Japanese educator 
in Taiwan, Kumamoto Shigekichi, stressed the importance of unified loyalty to the Emperor and 
to Pan-Asianism. According to Mark R. Peattie’s interpretation of Kumamoto: 
Pan-Asianism must be the assimilation by Japan of the peoples within its colonial empire 
in language, customs, and outlook. To accomplish this, Kumamoto urged redoubled 
efforts to provide a common education, particularly through diffusion the diffusion of the 
Japanese language, the abolition of discriminatory practices, the establishment of 
museums and libraries to foster the idea of a common cultural heritage, and above all a 
commitment to the idea of assimilation by Japanese colonists, whom he called upon to 
work more closely and generously with their Taiwanese neighbors in establishing a 
common loyalty.33 
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Kumamoto called for assimilation of the colonized under Japanese customs, language, and 
loyalty.34 His assertions represented a shift in Pan-Asianism’s policy from humanitarianism to 
assimilation, which was similar to Japan’s international, colonial competitors. Contradictions 
between colonial theorists made difficult the real policy implementation on the “front lines” of 
colonial administration. 
 Pan-Asian policy shifted with Togo Minoru who applied internationally-popular racial 
concepts to colonial theory. He differentiated various races and their “inherent” tendencies and 
created a sort of racial taxonomy. Although Togo did not completely refute humanitarian or 
assimilationist colonization policy, his racial categorizations certainly paralleled those adopted 
by European colonizers and Pan-Asian unification troublesome. Japan remained uni-racial 
throughout its history as an island. However, its East Asian neighbors, colonized subjects, and 
potential entrants into Pan-Asia were not uni-racial. Vietnam and China, in particular, were 
ethnically diverse and thus racial colonial theory conflicted with previously espoused equal 
education, governance, and treatment within Pan-Asia.35 
 Pan-Asianism’s architects debated for forty years (1905-1945) of the Japanese empire. 
The concept was nebulous and difficult to unpack for policy formulation. Even more difficult 
was enacted Pan-Asianism and its implementation in the colonies. Lack of a cogent, codified, 
and common understanding of Pan-Asianism and Japan’s imperial mission to save East Asia, 
distorted the idea from the action. Humanitarian, assimilation, and race-based theorization did 
not translate into what Pan-Asianism’s thinkers conceptualized. To the military governors and 
troops stationed in Japan’s colonies it resulted in reactionary and harsh treatment of indigenous 
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peoples. A disconnect existed between Japanese intellectuals and the military, domestically and 
throughout East Asia.36 
 Military colonial governors considered Pan-Asian assimilationist policy as license to 
exact total control over their colonial subjects. Military governors implemented ideological, 
economic, and political supremacy over the empire, contradicting the intended mission of Pan-
Asianism. While Japanese scholars and other intellectuals found commonalities in Pan-Asianism 
and nationalist thought with their East Asian contemporaries, the Japanese army and navy did 
not. As the Asia-Pacific War ignited in 1931 with Japan’s expansion into North China, Japan’s 
economic and military situation exacerbated the disconnect between theoretical Pan-Asianism 
and its real applications. War and a deteriorated geo-political climate during the early 1930s 
forced a shift in Pan-Asianism objectives to those more expedient for the military. The later form 
of Pan-Asianism manifested in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and focused on 
Japans’s economic and military expansion. Efforts doubled to create “one Asia for all Asians” 
under the auspices of the Japanese empire. While Japanese, Vietnamese, and Chinese 
intellectuals engaged on the university level in creating national narratives, the Japanese 
military’s dominion over its subjects, with its undeniable origins in bushido, governed 
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Chapter Two:  
China, Wang Jingwei, and Pan-Asianism (1931-1945) 
  Two, more widely known nationalist movements from 1937-1945, were the Chinese 
Communist Party under Mao Zedong and the Guomindang under Jiang Jieshi. Both were 
contemporaries of Wang Jingwei and the Reorganized National Government. Despite their 
alliance during the Asia Pacific War (1937-1945), the two factions were engaged in civil war, 
before and after 1945. After the 1911 Revolution and the end of the Warlord Era (1916-1928) 
both the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) and GMD (Guomindang) vied for power. However, 
their visions of a Chinese nation differed in some instances.  
 The leader of the CCP, Mao Zedong, attempted to unify the Chinese people from the 
“bottom-up;” Meaning, he and other Communist Party leaders believed that revolution and 
eventual unification would arise from the peasantry. Like Leninism, where revolution required 
use of the working-class proletariat, Mao’s idea of revolution required participation from the 
rural, agrarian and working classes. The CCP adopted from Soviet communism to modernize 
China and form a nation-state completely severed from its imperial past. Later, continuous 
revolution by Party planners tried to erase all of China’s cultural history, including 
Confucianism. Also, of note, the Chinese Communist Party not only opposed the Guomindang, 
but vehemently hated the Japanese invaders as they were severely anti-communist. Mao 
Zedong’s nationalism centered around re-inventing the Chinese narrative, separate from its 
history, and looking to reclaim China’s former, regional esteem.  
 Jiang Jieshi was President of the Guomindang’s Executive Yuan (executive branch) after 
the death of Sun Yixian in 1925. Like Wang and Sun, Jiang had studied alongside Japanese 
nationalists of the Genyosha Society in Tokyo, during the early twentieth century. The GMD 
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derived support from the urban populations, primarily middle-upper class educated Chinese. 
Therefore, Jiang’s idea of a Chinese nation-state began at the top and trickled down to the 
bottom of society, opposite of Mao’s revolutionary view. Jiang also looked to the West for 
support against the Japanese and later in the civil war against the Communists. Like Wang, Jiang 
Jieshi believed he was the successor to Sun Yixian’s legacy.   
  Wang Jingwei, born Chao-Ming, 1883, in Guangzhou, came from a scholarly family. As 
a youth, Wang “began to lose faith in the Manchu Dynasty…who had brought ineffaceable 
disgrace upon the Chinese people.”1 Since Wang’s earliest days, he believed in realizing China’s 
national self-determination and return to international prominence, free from feudal or colonial 
bonds. The Manchu Dynasty governed China for nearly three centuries and was not of Han 
descent, or Hanren. Many early Chinese nationalists alluded to an ethnic disconnect between the 
government in power and the Chinese people themselves. Wang’s comrade and friend Tang 
Leangli recalled Wang’s sense of nationalism sprouting at the height of Japanese modernization: 
The following year, 1903, a special examination was organized by the Kwangtung 
Provincial Government…to select promising students for study abroad…at the age of 
twenty  he went to Japan as a Government scholar. He joined the revolutionary 
movement under Dr. Sun Yixian when the Party leader arrived in Japan. It gave him an 
awakened sense of patriotism and [Wang] was the guardian of revolutionary heritage and 
the embodiment of the national-revolutionary spirit.2 
After studying in Japan with Dr. Sun Yixian and other Asian nationalists, Wang Jingwei 
continued his revolutionary work in China. The death of Sun on March 25, 1925 forced Wang 
into official leadership of the Nationalist Revolution.3 Wang Jingwei inherited the legacy of Sun 
Yixian after his death and was described as “champion of the people and the bitterest enemy of 
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predatory militarism…however threatening the foreign menace may be, China must first put all 
her house in order and find her salvation within herself.”4 Sentiments as described by Wang and 
his friend provide reasoning for Wang’s decision to seek Japanese aid during conflict between 
the Guomindang and Chinese Communist Party. 
The Marco Polo Bridge Incident, or Lugouqiao, on July 7th, 1937, commenced not only 
the Asia-Pacific War, but arguably initiated World War Two. The empire of Japan methodically 
annexed the majority of Asia within its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, including China 
and Vietnam. Japan gained territory and influence on the Korean peninsula and in Manchuria, 
after emerging victorious in the Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905. Later, in 1911, the Chinese 
Revolution deposed Qing imperial rule, leaving China vulnerable to external threats and Chinese 
nationalists sought assistance from their Japanese neighbors. Because of the Treaty of Versailles 
1919-1920, Germany forfeited possessions in Tsingtao over to Japan, an Allied power during the 
First World War. Subsequently, Japan engaged in economic and geographic speculation and 
established business firms, railroad companies, and colonies on the mainland. In 1931, the 
Mukden Incident solidified Japan’s continental foothold as they seized Manchuria. The 
following year, the state of Manchu (Manchukuo) formed with Qing emperor Pu Yi at its head 
and support from the Japanese empire.  
 During Japan’s systematic invasion, the Guomindang under Jiang Jieshi and the Chinese 
Communist Party under Mao Zedong vied for control of China from 1927-1937. The 
Guomindang continued Sun Yixian’s (Sun Yatsen, considered the father of Chinese nationalism) 
legacy, attempted to expel communism from China, and strived for national unification. 
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However, Mao Zedong’s CCP provided an alternative route to nationhood and subsequent civil 
war proceeded. Until 1937, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) unsuccessfully pursued Mao Zedong 
(Mao Tse-tung) on a long, communist-hunting expedition. Faced with daunting external enemies, 
imminent invasion, and after heated deliberation with his staff, Jiang Jieshi agreed to ally with 
the CCP and expel the Japanese intruders.5 The GMD/CCP allied after Japanese soldiers 
demanded entrance to Guomindang-held Wanping in North China. GMD troops denied Japanese 
entry and Japanese forces responded by forcefully taking the city. Thus, combined Chinese 
factions vowed Japanese expulsion from the mainland.  
 As the War Against Japanese Aggression raged, a rift within Guomindang leadership 
developed between two of Sun Yixian’s protégés, Jiang Jieshi and Wang Jingwei (Wang Ching-
wei). Jiang chose to gain support from the Chinese population through total retaliation against 
Japanese incursions. Wang, with his political acumen, desired a diplomatic path to halt Japanese 
advances. Despite being two key figures within the same Chinese nationalist circles, Jiang and 
Wang were opposed strategically on the Japanese problem. General Jiang headed the Whampoa 
Military Academy and Wang was Sun Yixian’s, Japanese educated, political right-hand man.  
Both clashed on how to lead China out of the darkness caused by immanent occupation. While 
Jiang Jieshi responded militarily, Japanese forces swiftly occupied Chinese cities and provinces. 
Beijing, Tianjin, and Nanjing all fell to Imperial forces by December 1937.6 Chinese forces were 
continuously defeated and Wang Jingwei believed it imperative that Chinese nationalists 
cooperate with Japan. According to Wang, the only way Chinese sovereignty remained intact 
was through accepting advisement and diplomatic engagement with their neighbors. By October 
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1938, Jiang’s capital at Nanjing fell to Japanese forces and compelled the Guomindang’s 
relocation to Chongqing. Wang Jingwei followed the GMD government to Chongqing, but after 
word reached Jiang that he conducted peace-talks with Japanese officials, several attempts were 
made on his life and others like him. Wang attempted to release official correspondence between 
Jiang and Japanese officials, from the outset of the war, that discussed an armistice. As such, 
Jiang Jieshi attempted to silence Wang Jingwei and did not accept his last pleas for peaceful 
negotiation with Japan. Before his temporary exodus to Hanoi, Wang Jingwei published an 
expository article titled “Yandian,” and argued for peaceful cooperation with the Japanese 
government. After Wang published his article, he was stripped of all  governmental positions, 
dismissed from the GMD, and subsequently fled to Vietnam.7  
 On March 30, 1940, with assistance from Japanese advisors, Wang Jingwei established 
the Reorganized Nationalist Government of China in Nanjing. Kagesa Sadaaki, of Japanese 
special services agency, Chen Bijun, Wang’s wife and political partner, and General Yazaki 
aided Wang Jingwei in government operations.8 The Reorganized Government enjoyed valuable 
political, economic, and military support from Japan. Japan viewed Wang’s government as the 
true embodiment of Chinese nationalism and fostered indigenous movements throughout the 
Greater East Asia Sphere.9 Official Japanese policy under the Konoe Cabinet supported 
indigenous nationalist movements and allowed them self-governance, within the Greater East 
Asia Sphere. Just as Wang’s government received aid from Japan, so did they adopt modern 
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Japanese methods in adherence to East Asian tradition. The military is not only a symbol of the 
state’s monopoly on violence and enforcement, but also a symbol of modernity.10 Wang Jingwei 
formed the new Reorganized National Army with Japanese tutelage and influence. Historically 
deemed as a “puppet” state, the Reorganized National Government existed as an antithesis to 
prevalent Chinese governments of the period, i.e. the Guomindang and Chinese Communist 
Party. While Mao and Jiang resisted, Wang labored to preserve China through cooperation. 
Japanese policy, starting with the Konoe cabinet (1937-1939), called for self-governance or 
“Chinese governing Chinese.”11 Provisions for self-governance within occupied territories 
prevented logistical overload for Japanese officials as they expanded and engaged on numerous 
fronts in the Pacific.  
 At the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, Japanese and Chinese 
intellectuals enjoyed an amiable rapport in the concept of Pan-Asianism. The concept derived 
from shared cultural, racial, ideological, and ethno-linguistic ties between the majority of Asian 
countries which were benefactors of ancient Chinese civilization. To fully grasp the origins of 
modern Japanese, Pan-Asian nationalism, a brief exposition is necessary. Nationalism was the 
life-blood of the modern Japanese state after the Meiji Restoration and industrialization. Patriotic 
indoctrination was crucial in creating obedient citizens of the state and began with education. In 
the following excerpt from an “Imperial Rescript on Education, 1890,” the importance of 
morality as derived from Confucianism is asserted against dangerous ideals from the West: “Ye, 
our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and 
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wives be harmonious, as friends true, bear yourselves in modesty and moderation…for the public 
good and promote common interests.”12 The “Imperial Rescript on Education” characterizes a 
basis in Confucianism, of an ordered society searching for harmony, which Japanese nationalism 
reified. As stated before, Japanese educational patterns were universal and compulsory in order 
to mold efficient and obedient citizens for a strong state structure.13 Nationalism and nations seek 
to establish their roots in history, mythologized or not, and attempt to “connect historically actual 
societies to a perceived order of the universe. These myths contribute to the formation of the 
image of a bounded nation.”14 Other facets of the past utilized by the Japanese state were revival 
of Shintoism, reverence to shrines related to antiquity, myths, traditions, and bushido (way of the 
samurai). The progressive movement of modernization was accompanied by a strong appeal to 
the past.15  
 Japanese nationalist concepts developed with an anti-West element and it spread 
throughout Asia.16 Due to contemporary circumstances at the time, China was subordinated to 
Western powers and Japanese nationalism echoed sentiments from Chinese nationalists. Chinese 
and Japanese nationalism reacted against and with each other in symbiosis. Early appeal for 
Japanese branded Pan-Asianism is evident in the early twentieth century. The Genyosha Society 
of Japan harbored numerous Asian nationalists from the early to mid-twentieth century, 
including Dr. Sun Yixian and Wang Jingwei.17 A certain Genyosha’s home in Tokyo, Toyoma 
Mitsuru “became the focal point for rebels and would-be rebels from China, India, Annam, and 
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the Phillipines…the Chinese who were plotting to overthrow the Manchu dynasty; a link was 
forged between ultra-nationalism in Japan and revolutionary nationalism in China.”18 Numerous 
occasions show that Pan-Asian nationalism in the twentieth century was concurrent with that of 
Japan. The Japanese aim was to assist the formation of a Chinese government in tandem with the 
ideals of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. “With the help of a powerful Japan, the 
peoples of Asia will work together for independence. The aim of the present war [World War 
Two] is the realization of His Majesty’s august will and ideal that the peoples of the world 
should each be granted possession of their rightful homelands.”19 Wang Jingwei thus set up a 
Chinese government, one of which the Japanese believed to be the true voice of Chinese 
nationalism and that of Sun Yixian.  
 Much of the relationship between Chinese and Japanese nationalists formed prior to 
1937. One way in which it initiated was through “Sinology” or the study of China by Japanese 
academics and intellectuals. It was a common conception by Japanese scholars of the time that 
Japan was a poor country, poor in traditional culture as well as natural resources. China however 
was rich in both.20 Bound by racial, cultural, and linguistic ties, Japanese intellectuals linked 
Japan’s survival to advancement of Pan-Asianism onto the continent. One account from Naito 
Konan, a journalist and professor in the early to mid-twentieth century, expresses that, “the 
general assumption that all of mankind participates in the creation of ideals for a world 
civilization. These ideals sought the perfection of truth; truth in the sense that Japan would 
arouse knowledge of Asia; goodness in Japan’s unshakeable commitment to oppose imperialist 
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oppression in East Asia from the West.”21 Konan, in forming nationalist discourse in Japan, 
utilizes Confucian rhetoric in forming a civilization on truth. He also recognizes, like many other 
Asian nationalists, the important role of shared history and cultural heritage in arousing 
knowledge of the past to coincide with the present. Inherent in Pan-Asian nationalism and 
Sinology is the refutation that Asian civilization was substandard and backwards in comparison 
to Western civilization, a tool often used by Western colonizers.22 Naito continued to call for 
scholarly ventures into China in an effort to rival similar Western endeavors. His mission, and 
the mission of all Asian nationalists, was to mobilize and stir 500 million East Asians.23 Baba 
Haruyoshi of a Greater East Asia educational exchange program established a school in Jinan to 
provide educational opportunities to lower-class Chinese. This was paired with the reification of 
the Confucius School in Qufu and directed to expelling Western ideals that had combatted 
Confucianism. Revival of ancient Chinese culture and vicariously that of Confucian ideology 
and Japanese culture was supported by Wang Jingwei and the Reformed Government in its 
aspirations for peace and Asian nationalism.24 Behind Japanese scholars’ and intellectuals’ 
national discourse lay an earlier version of the “domino theory.” Japan could participate in the 
reform of China with proper comprehension of Chinese history. Naito linked Japan’s 
contemporary fate to that of China; Japan had to help China or both would collapse before the 
Western onslaught.25 
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 Tourism, as clarified by Benedict Anderson in Imagined Communities, is a hallmark of 
the state’s continuation of the “national project.” Museums, battle sites, and destinations of the 
like all further an origin narrative; in this case the similarities of Japanese and Chinese culture, 
and serve to impress upon the citizenry a sense of national pride.26 Japan preserved heritage 
landscapes that defined the history of Asian civilization and cites it deemed as quintessentially 
“Asian.” The significance of locations like Mukden located in Manchuria and Nanjing located in 
Central China, resided in the battles that were fought and won by the Japanese. Conversely, 
Qufu’s significance is established as the origin of Confucianism, the ideology behind the 
majority of Asian political, social, and legal structures. Okakura Tenshin of a Japanese travel 
bureau termed his country (Japan) as the “museum of Asian civilization.”27 From Japanese 
Travel Bureau representatives to intellectuals, historic sites in China were just as Pan-Asian as 
the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, commemorating the Japanese fallen in battle. The goal of 
Japanese tourism, in service of not only Japanese nationalism but the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere, was to portray Japanese aims as righteous.28 The preservation of sites in 
Nanjing like the breakthrough of Japanese forces in 1937, Ming mausoleums, and Sun Yixian’s 
grave, all pre-eminent symbols of Chinese nationalism, were used in a melding with Japan’s Pan-
Asiatic movement.29 Japan’s transnationalist approach to Pan-Asia sought to sustain historical 
inheritances of the past, like Ming sites and Qufu, to show its Asian neighbors where it came 
from, to build upon mythologized origins, and feed from national narratives for indigenous 
movements against the West. Clearly, there existed support from Japanese intellectuals for 
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certain Chinese nationalists who were willing to enter into the Greater East Asia Sphere Project. 
Through tourism, museums, and battle sites, nationalism maintains relevance through time and 
space, thereby latching onto a history that is continuous and ever-present for posterity. 
 The discourse of Japanese nationalism viewed the reform of China as a duty to all of Asia 
to maintain their cultural integrity. China had failed to sustain the seed of Asian civilization and 
Japan would answer the call. Many nationalists believed that they owed China a substantial 
cultural debt as a child would owe their parents for a good upbringing. The over-arching, all-
encompassing, ideological themes of Pan-Asian nationalism transcended geographical and 
political boundaries. Tachibana Shiraki, a Japanese nationalist, and Sun Yixian both preached 
concepts of harmonious cohesion among Asian neighbors.30 Parroting the words of Sun Yixian, 
Naito Konan stated that “knowledge had to lead towards action in the contemporary world.”31 
This knowledge existed as a common historical experience, common culture, common ethno-
linguistics, and common reliance on Confucianism between fellow Asians.  
 Other Japanese perspectives came from those directly involved with initiating Pan-
Asianism nationalism and forming the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.32 Mamoru 
Shigemitsu, in his post-war memoirs, characterizes feelings of many Japanese government 
officials when he states “my contention was that Japan’s war-aim was to liberate the Orient.”33 
With that, Japan acknowledged other nations rights to sovereignty and self-determination. 
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Japan’s desire for the self-governance of its neighbors is in contrast to the desires of European 
hegemony. European colonial reactions were always violent towards indigenous movements and 
halted their formation with an iron fist. Thus Asian nationalists flocked to Japan and overall, the 
Second World War gave impetus to post-colonial nationalist movements in East Asia.34 Western 
powers would once again encounter such nationalist movements, ignited by Japanese occupation, 
during the hot part of the Cold War. In the French Indochina War (1946-1954), Vietnam War 
(1964-1975), Malaysia, former Dutch East Indies, the Korean War (1950-present), and various 
encounters with China from the 1950s to 1970s, the West bore the effects of Pan-Asian 
nationalism. 
 Transitioning from the Japanese perspective looking at China, the Chinese perspective 
looking towards Japan is also of great importance. China after all, was the recipient of this 
nationalistic inheritance. A common stance from Chinese nationalists was one of yearning. A 
yearning that looked at Japan adopting Western methods of modernization and industrialization, 
branded them in their own Asian style, and turned it against the West and in defense of East 
Asia. Early Chinese nationalists such as Sun Yixian studied in Japan and witnessed firsthand the 
swift stimulus of Pan-Asian nationalism taking hold of a neighboring country and mobilizing for 
liberation from Western tyranny. Through adoption of Western methods of industrialization, 
“there arose amongst the Japanese people a patriotic movement in favor of expulsion of the 
‘aliens’.”35 An air of comparison was obvious in the works of Sun Yixian as he constantly 
compared the present situation in China with that of Japan. Reforms in Japan appeared as 
brilliant successes and affairs in China were otherwise. As referenced by early Japanese 
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nationalists like Naito, Japan was weak before its reforms and after it emerged as one of the great 
powers; power that China aspired to rightfully reclaim as its own, releasing itself from 
encroaching European hegemony.  
 Sun Yixian never realized his ambitions for Chinese nationalism and sovereignty. 
However, his successor Wang Jingwei attempted to carry on his true legacy for the self-
determination of China and the vestiges of securing for China a status of equality and unqualified 
independence in the family of nations.36 Japanese influence on Wang Jingwei is manifest in his 
time spent with Sun Yixian in Japan. “These years of study in Japan had decisive influence on 
the young scholar…awakened in Wang a sense of patriotism.”37 Wang Jingwei no doubt 
implemented the tenets of Pan-Asianism acquired in Japan in his own nationalist government in 
China. Unlike his contemporaries, Wang did not believe the issue facing China was resisting 
Japan, but rather preserving China as a nation. The so-called “collaborationist” government 
strove to preserve China against Western aggression rather than against occupation by their 
fellow Asian neighbors. In an excerpt from his work, Wang summarizes his nationalist views in: 
 
Advocating the policy of “co-existence” of China and Japan. In order that the voice of 
these liberals may gain ascendancy in Japan, it is necessary that not only Japanese, but 
Chinese also, should exert themselves towards this end. If this policy of coexistence of 
China and Japan be realized through combined efforts of two peoples. To reach the goal 
of national salvation we must therefore put up the most determined resistance against 
Communist banditry and foreign aggression.38 
 
Anti-communism and anti-West sentiments were shared by both Chinese and Japanese 
nationalists. If Pan-Asianism was congruent with Confucian ideology, then communism 
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disrupted the natural order of society and did not lead to harmonious interaction between Asian 
countries and peoples.  
 In continuing with a Chinese perspective looking abroad to Japan, Chinese nationalists 
perceived Japan to be the model which all Asians could aspire and repel Western incursions. 
Sovereignty was a key goal for Wang Jingwei and his government, sovereignty of which had 
been wrested by Great Britain, Germany, France, and the United States since the nineteenth 
century. Therefore, with Wang, a recharged sovereign state, in the style of Meiji Japan came to 
be regarded as essential for fending off colonial attempts from the Occident.39 Also, internal 
Chinese opposition was an issue for Wang’s Reorganized Government. Jiang Jieshi branded 
Wang and his “collaborationist” government as traitors, banning them from the Guomindang. 
Claiming legitimacy over the Guomindang was an effort that the Reorganized Government 
struggled with in representing the Chinese nation. Unlike Jiang Jieshi’s government which relied 
on urban elites, Wang’s nationalism provided Chinese peasants in the rural areas the type of 
nationalism that mixed intense anti-Western sentiment with imported cosmopolitan ideology of 
equal states within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japan’s invasion, coupled with 
long-term Western oppression, charged the political environment of late colonial China with 
sufficient energy to generate the degree of sentiment needed for twentieth century Chinese 
nationalism to attain mass allegiance.40 Whether reactionary or cooperative, Japan’s presence in 
China stimulated and energized the sleeping giant that was Chinese nationalism. Wang’s 
perceptions of the Japanese policy towards Asian neighbors were confirmed on the Japanese 
side. The Japanese government created an official ideology of anti-colonial liberation for its 
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empire. Additionally, it was not a salutation of Japanese imperialism, but an affirmation of East 
Asian liberation. Thus, Pan-Asian ideology acknowledged indigenous nationalism by depicting 
the future of Asia as reliant on the strength of anti-colonial movements for self-determination 
and celebrating the Asian nation and submerging it into a loftier Asian identity.41 Sun Yixian, in 
his nationalist work Three Principles of the People, affirmed ideals of Japanese Pan-Asianism as 
letting the people “ live in peace and take pleasure in their occupations” while relying on East 
Asian morality and intensifying a sense of conflict with Western powers in an effort to 
concentrate ideological work. Wang Jingwei affirmed Sun’s sentiment while indicating Chinese 
achievements through the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: “1) Revoking colonial status 
and restoring Chinese sovereignty 2) Restoring East Asian values and culture 3) Asserting full 
racial equality between yellow and white races.”42 By reifying the thoughts of Sun Yixian, 
Wang’s National Government allied itself with Japan’s East Asian vision while accentuating 
Pan-Asian tenets.  
 On the topic of politics, the Reorganized Chinese Government under Wang Jingwei 
utilized various Japanese political outlets in promoting their marque of nationalism. From the 
Japanese side, the strategy of using “Chinese to control Chinese” was implemented at every 
opportunity, especially with the collaborationists.43 “Dismembering of the Chinese nation was 
not something that the Japanese government either wanted or intended.”44 Despite war and 
aggression displayed by Japan, its political intent was not to destroy China’s national feeling, but 
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to harmoniously incorporate it into the project of Pan-Asianism. The Japanese were to force a 
new form of collaborationist nationalism that could dovetail with the legacy of Sun Yixian, of 
whom Japanese intellectuals and nationalists themselves admired.45 Japan attempted to do so by 
accentuating commonalities like Chinese-derived linguistics, common history, and similar socio-
ideological origins through Confucianism, between itself and other Asian neighbors. Wang 
Jingwei and his wife Madame Wang, who was politically involved in the Reorganized 
Government, operated with Japanese military officials and politicians to further their goals of 
peace and Pan-Asianism. Kagesa Sadaaki, head of Japanese Special Services Agency, was 
indispensable to Wang Jingwei and played an important role in establishing Wang’s state on 
March 30, 1940. Sadaaki served as the first Japanese military advisor to the Wang government.46 
Another General Yazaki served in the same capacity from 1944-1945.47 Many of the political 
sentiments held by Wang’s government were shared with Japanese politicians as well. While 
governing over Guangdong Province, Madame Wang shared a belief with her husband that there 
could be no peace without anti-communism.48 Certainly anti-communism was not only a belief 
held by Japanese politicians, but also by the Reorganized Government’s nationalist rival, Jiang 
Jieshi.   
 Wang also promoted Japanese propaganda. Provincial authorities of Wang’s government, 
including his wife, propagandized Japanese ideas of Pan-Asianism and the idea of “same culture, 
same race.”49 The Japanese permitted the spread of Neo-Confucianism and other aspects of 
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Chinese traditional culture in an effort to garrison nationalist sentiment behind the Reorganized 
Government.50 With Japanese support for the revitalization of Chinese culture, there existed a 
political and social congruity in that Japanese rhetoricians used historical narratives of China’s 
past to legitimate not only the Reorganized Government’s position, but that of their own Pan-
Asian aims. The reifying of Asian traditions, rooted in the origins of Confucianism, was used 
throughout Asia by the Japanese empire to justify uniting against intrusions by the West, thereby 
sowing the seeds of nationalist fervor over the continent. 
 Wang Jingwei’s major aim “was to seek a settlement with Japan to end the Sino-Japanese 
War and steer China…to identify with Japan’s New Order in East Asia.”51 Many founding 
members of Chinese nationalism, including Sun Yixian and Wang Jingwei, recognized Pan-
Asianism, with its racial and cultural concomitants, as integral to not only Japanese, but Chinese 
intellectual tradition.52 Much of this is evident in congruent feelings of both Chinese and 
Japanese intellectuals of the period, that Western aggression should be stopped.53 The continuity 
of race, common culture, and hegemony by Euro-American powers bound nationalist, Chinese 
collaborators to Pan-Asian, Japanese ideology. previously established racial sentiments observed 
by Chinese collaborators were reflective of Japanese Pan-Asianism and that they readily adopted 
ideas from Japan for their own struggle.54 The struggle was peace, homogeneity of Asian 
peoples, and national self-determination for China. Decades before the war against Japanese 
aggression, Sun Yixian, the progenitor of Chinese nationalism, acknowledged the Japanese idea 
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of Pan-Asianism.55 Many of these sentiments were shared by other Chinese nationalist groups, 
including those within the Chinese Communist Party and the Goumindang. 
 Wang Jingwei also sought to reform his military based on Japanese models and “in 1938, 
Wang sent an envoy to the Japanese and received an agreement that if he joined them, they 
would assist him.”56 In support of Wang’s nationalist government, Japan sent military instructors 
and advisors in addition to weapons and ammunition. This was clearly a backing of Wang’s 
nationalist movement and their desire to preserve Chinese nationalism against the resistance 
forces of the Chinese Communist Party and Guomindang. Wang wanted to create a truly 
politically motivated army that would fight side by side with the Japanese against the illegitimate 
movements of Jiang Jieshi and Mao Zedong.57 As such, the Japanese agreed to equip and 
establish the Reorganized Government’s army and “promote Wang’s government as the true 
disciples of Sun Yixian.”58 The Japanese military structure, just as in Burma, Vietnam, and 
Indonesia, affected Chinese nationalist movements after the war ended and China resumed its 
civil war. Wang took to the adage “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” It only reiterates the 
need for survival of Chinese nationalism and their congruent feelings towards communism with 
the Japanese. 
 American perspectives on the war in East Asia were initially passive and detached. Until 
the late 1930s, the United States held a more amiable relationship with the Far East in 
comparison to their European counterparts. American interest in the region had not actively 
pursued territorial interests or exhibited colonial aspirations like Great Britain, France, and 
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Germany.59 Joseph C. Grew served as the American Ambassador to Japan from 1931-1941 and 
became acquainted with Japanese nationalism and Pan-Asian ideology during his tenure there. 
They are representative of the American perspective leading up to the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor on December 7, 1941. His accounts exemplified the ebbs and flows of American-
Japanese diplomacy as Japan began to expand its empire uncomfortably close to American 
economic and business interests in Asia. Ambassador Grew was stationed in Japan from 1931 to 
1941 and his memoirs expressed an inevitable disintegration of U.S.- Japanese relations. In citing 
American interest in Japanese affairs in East Asia, Grew said “The American Government and 
people understand what is meant by the ‘new order in East Asia’ precisely as clearly as it is 
understood in Japan. The ‘new order in East Asia’ has been officially defined in Japan as an 
order of security, stability, and progress.”60 Before the gradual devolution of diplomacy between 
the United States and Japan, an air of understanding and sympathy was exhibited by Americans 
towards Japan’s position while simultaneously perceiving Japanese ambitions from a non-Asian 
lens. In one diary entry Grew outlines American thoughts on Japanese Pan-Asianism: 
The New Order in East Asia envisages permanent Japanese control of Manchuria, Inner 
Mongolia, and North China. Wang Jingwei’s subserviency to Japanese interests is being 
done to bring permanent peace to China…prevent the spread of communism in to Japan 
proper. It was Prince Konoe and other Government members’ determination that should 
Japan should not oppress, exploit, or interfere with other countries’ integrity.61 
 
There existed between American and Japanese diplomats a healthy rapport on the topic of the 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, one side attempting to comprehend the other in a 
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constant dialogue. Grew recorded his exchange with Ambassador Matsuoka as the latter 
explained why Japan joined the Axis on October 5, 1940: 
The construction of a new order in East Asia means the construction of a new order in 
which Japan establishes the relationship of common existence and mutual prosperity with 
the peoples of each and every land in East Asia…In a position of equality with every 
other country, Japan may freely carry on enterprises, trade, and emigration in and to each 
and every land in Greater East Asia.62 
 
Grew recognized Matsuoka and the Konoe Cabinets’ implementation of a sphere of mutual 
prosperity and endeavoring to abolish restrictions on the free activities of mankind.63 Prime 
Minister Konoe Fumimaro (in office 1937-39 and 1940-41) was a Pan-Asianist from a young age 
and believed that the West had actively kept the East down in international politics. He was the 
main force behind the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and believed it was Japan’s duty 
cooperate and protect its neighbors.64 In relation to the Japanese occupation of China, this 
translated to severing the colonial grips of European powers and allowing the Chinese nation to 
enjoy all the rights of sovereignty as granted by the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere and 
paradoxically Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” and President Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms.”65 In a 
private conversation concerning Roosevelt’s fears of Japanese dictatorship in China, Grew 
records a senior Japanese statesmen and in an attempt to understand what the President had in 
mind, the statesmen retorts “Japan was at least not under a dictatorship; and then he had got it; 
why of course he was referring to Jiang Jieshi, the perfect dictator…he could not imagine any 
country less democratic than Jiang Jieshi’s China.”66 Not only did Wang Jingwei perceive his 
own government to be the rightful embodiment of Sun Yixian’s legacy and Jiang Jieshi’s 
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government to be leading China to a path of devolved dictatorship, Japan also held a similar 
understanding of the Guomindang’s oppressive regime.  
 Through American Ambassador Joseph C. Grew, an external perspective nonetheless, 
Japan’s intentions for China were made evident. Ambassador Grew’s careful, first-hand 
documentation of his experience with Japan provides a transnational lens. His accounts finished 
before the outbreak of the United States entrance into the war and are not distorted by a victor’s 
historical account. Wang Jingwei’s nationalist China desired cooperation with Japan for the 
attainment of sovereignty, peace, and preservation of the nation. Japan stood stoic for all Pan-
Asian nationalism and as a catalyst for which to realize not only nationhood, but freedom from 
oppression by the West. Through the ideological understanding of Pan-Asian nationalism, 
countries cooperated within the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere and united against 
imperial forays from the Occident. Ambassador Grew makes this apparent when he recalls the 
words of Waseda University’s president on February 26, 1941, “as stressed in the Konoe 
statement made some time ago, Japan’s purpose in the present conflict is not a petty territorial 
acquisition…It is rather to safeguard China’s independence, and, respecting her sovereignty, to 
establish a New Order in East Asia.”67 In tandem with the Konoe cabinet, the Japanese concept 
of hakko ichiu (universal peace) meant no conquest, no oppression, and no exploitation of any 
peoples.68 Grew also makes it clear that Japanese aspirations for China were overall peaceful in 
intent and cooperative in nature and included the desire for neighborly friendship, respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, cooperative defense between the two countries, and fusion of 
Chinese nationalists into one government. 69 To enact the ideologies of the Greater East Asian 
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Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japan and Wang Jingwei sought to modernize and nationalize China from 
above by uniting behind one strain of Pan-Asian nationalism- Sun Yixian’s nationalism of 
harmonious cooperation of Asia- the various groups vying for the sympathies of the people. 
Synchronized with Confucianism, Pan-Asianism strived for sovereign nations while not 
upsetting social order. Pan-Asianism as attempted by Wang and Japanese advisors strived for 
modernization while maintaining a “natural order” as prescribed by Confucianism. Intellectuals 
and academics, through education, politics, the military, and economics, were the intended tools 
for disseminating the Pan-Asian narrative and Wang’s pragmatic nationalism.      
 In analyzing the sources, the question of whether and to what extent Japanese occupation 
affected Chinese nationalism must be answered. Based on the aforementioned evidence, 
Japanese and Chinese nationalists shared similar beliefs as to how to unite the people behind the 
state and to expel the West. However, Wang Jingwei’s government was labeled by the victors of 
World War Two, namely Chinese Communists and the Guomindang, as treacherous and 
demonized for cooperating with Japan, during the war and for generations after. The 
historiographical evolution has shown that use of this label in narration has changed. As Timothy 
Brook pointed out, nationalism as exemplified by Jiang Jieshi in reaction to Japanese aggression 
ran counter to Wang Jingwei’s construal of nationalism by cooperation and inclusion into a 
Greater Asian community. Nationalism by so-labeled “collaboration” was simply a differing 
interpretation of Chinese nation-ness and yet more congruent with Sun Yixian’s contribution to 
China’s national discourse. Gaining and preserving sovereignty, not futile resistance against a 
fellow Asian nation, was the cornerstone of Wang’s nationalism. Bearing the brunt of Japanese 
advance into China proved to be the beginning of the end for Jiang Jieshi’s nationalists as Mao 
Zedong prepared for a protracted revolution.  
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 Conversely, Japanese nationalism aligned with the nationalist inheritance of Sun Yixian 
and Wang Jingwei. As such, Wang remained an outlier by accepting the precepts of the Greater 
East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere in the subsequent narratives written by opposing Chinese 
nationalists and Allied powers. Arguably, Mao Zedong and Jiang Jieshi both ceded some degree 
of sovereignty to Western powers by accepting aid. For purposes of winning World War Two, 
the Allied powers utilized the Guomindang and Chinese Communists to combat Japan in the 
Pacific Theater. Following that, the People’s Republic of China was subordinated to the greater 
cause of international communist revolution led by Moscow and Jiang Jieshi’s government was 
driven to Taiwan only to be a pawn in the grander chess game of the Cold War. That, however, is 
to be expounded on in another work.  
 It is the re-interpretation of this work to alter the use of “collaboration,” 
“collaborationists,” and Wang Jingwei as a traitor when describing this particular breed of 
nationalism. Collaboration holds an air of unconstructiveness and pointed language used by the 
authors of history-the victors. Historical interpretation is relative and based on experience and 
personal bias. Mao Zedong and Jiang Jieshi experienced Japanese occupation from different 
vantages and Wang Jingwei from his. One side of Chinese nationalist discourse selected 
resistance and the other, cooperation. Popular use of the term collaboration robs the Reorganized 
Nationalist Government of its historical agency and establishes a poor attempt for objectivity. 
Wang Jingwei’s Rreorganized Government did not abandon the nation’s absolute claim that it 
has a right to exist.70 As opposed to resistance against Japan, like the position taken by Jiang 
Jieshi, Wang Jingwei envisaged China finding peace with its neighbor and working within East 
Asia to preserve Asian nationalism and culture. Wang Jingwei’s government was a legitimate 
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intimation of nationalist feeling in China because it in fact preserved sovereignty through 
cooperation with the Japanese empire. In terms of the Reorganized Government’s Minister of 
Education, Gu Cheng, the issue facing China was how to survive national extinction and 
collaboration was the only realistic means for survival.71 Binaries of “good” and “bad” have no 
place in proper historical parlance. There are simply alternate interpretations by groups 
unbounded by politically-charged historical narrative.  
 Wang Jingwei’s interpretation of Chinese nationalism should not be discredited by the 
dominant historical lens of his rivals. As stated before, cooperative nationalism with the Japanese 
spoke only in terms of the nation; patriotism, reclaiming a magnificent Chinese history, speaking 
in the mother-tongue of all Asia, realizing a degree of ethnic homogeneity, and common cultural 
ties in Confucianism. All of these shared interests resulted in a dialectic of preserving China as a 
nation through forming bonds with Japanese nationalists-the alternate dialectic of Jiang Jieshi 
and Mao Zedong culminated in resistance and eventually seized its stage of history.  
 Additionally, Chinese nationalists were substantially influenced and arguably envious of 
not only Japanese state nationalism, but their subsequent brand of Pan-Asian nationalism. From 
Sun Yixian’s tenure in Japan, frequenting Genyosha meeting places, to Wang Jingwei’s 
understanding of what China needed, Japan existed as the model for its Asian contemporaries 
prior to, during, and after World War Two. Although it is not covered here, the Burma National 
Army, Indian National Army, Indonesian, Malaysian, and Vietnamese were either modeled after 
or constructed along the Japanese example, often with aid from Japanese officers. As such, 
China’s Reorganized National Army was abetted by the Japanese, instructed by Japanese 
officers, and equipped by Japan. Armies are symbolic of the state’s power and the state is 
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arguably connected to the nation. Therefore, in just this one example of Japan influencing Asian 
nationalists, the military was exemplar of Japanese influence throughout East Asia.  
 Along with that, much of the language of Chinese nationalists, as expounded earlier, was 
also the language of their Japanese counterparts. Leading up to World War Two, Japanese 
intellectuals served as natural associates to Chinese intellectuals. As evidenced by other 
examples of nationalism, nation-ness and its story is propagated by intellectuals and scholars. 
Both interpret and narrate history of the nation and thus have power over knowledge of the 
nation. Conversely, the narrative is presented to the people of the nation in national terms of 
common interests, shared feelings of “one-ness,” and tied together by the same language, ethnic 
background, and origin myths. With Pan-Asian nationalism, national feeling was not contained 
within political boundaries, but spread trans-nationally in reaction to Western ideals.  
 Scholars, historians, and intellectuals like Naito controlled the narrative of how Chinese 
viewed their country internally and Japanese looking in at China. Tourism is integral in forming 
this narrative. Cites at Mukden, Qufu, and Nanjing were all exemplary of Pan-Asian nationalism 
and the influence of Japanese leadership in that project. Epitaphs of battles and military victories 
served to glorify the mission of the nation such as at Mukden. Cultural and originary myths, 
symbols, and literary works were intended to portray ideological and mythical continuity, like 
the Japanese renovation of Qufu, Confucius’ birthplace. Confucianism stood as a cornerstone of 
a harmonious and structured society in Pan-Asian nationalism; embodying the seed of East Asian 
civilization through Confucianism’s rationalized structure in the Greater East Asian Co-
Prosperity Sphere, with Japan as the head of the new order and subsequent neighbors following 
suit in a cooperative manner. This concept was exemplified by the cooperative government of 
Wang Jingwei in preserving China and taking its proper role in the family of transnational Asia. 
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Finally, the tourism of Nanjing was also utilized by intellectuals and scholars in the formation of 
a nationalist narrative. The Japanese influence was apparent in not only adopting it as a shining 
example of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, but also demonstrated the modernizing 
effect of nationalism and national reconstruction. Japanese tourism to Nanjing as the epitome of 
a modern China was certainly the embodiment of Sun Yixian’s call for national reconstruction 
and restoring China to its rightful glory. Not only did Nanjing personify modern China, but it 
was also the capital of Wang Jingwei’s government. The seat of the Chinese nation-state existed 
within one of its most modern cities.  
 Another way in which Japanese occupation of China influenced the national discourse 
was the redirection of its focus. In the early to mid-twentieth century, Chinese nationalist 
movements were focused internally. This resulted in decades of turmoil as local warlords vied 
for scraps of residual power left by the crumbling Qing dynasty. With this, Western nations 
found an opportunity to capitalize, economically and strategically, on the Chinese civil war by 
wresting territory and sovereignty from China as well as Japan. Coupled with a healthy rapport 
between Chinese and Japanese nationalists, cooperation with Japanese occupation refocused 
Chinese nationalist discourse from an internal struggle to the external threat looming from the 
West. In transferring Chinese nationalist foci from internal bickering to external dangers, the 
Japanese occupation was highly significant in uniting China as a nation.  
 The Sino-Japanese relationship also affected nationalist discourse. Prior to the outbreak 
of war, Japanese intellectuals and scholars had looked to China as the “parental” example of 
nationalism and eventually Pan-Asianism. It found in China, as seen by Naito and Japanese 
tourism to Mukden, Qufu, and Nanjing, inspiration for unifying its own nation. State sponsored 
Shintoism, similar language and writing, cultural origins, and Confucianism were distilled from 
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China and adopted by Japan. As a result of Japan’s search in China for original inspiration as an 
Asian nation, Japan inspired the attention of Chinese nationalists as well. Japan, in sculpting its 
nation-state, interacted with Chinese contemporaries. These natural counter-parts in nationalist 
thought exchanged ideas and formed nationalist narratives in which China thus looked to Japan 
for inspiration. That is one reason for Chinese nationalists like Sun Yixian and Wang Jingwei to 
study in Tokyo. Interaction between Asian neighbors formed a symbiotic and synchronized Pan-




Vietnam and Pan-Asianism (1940-1945) 
As the Japanese invaded China and began the Second World War, similar events unfolded in 
Southeast Asia.  Nazi Germany defeated France in 1940 and the Vichy collaborationist 
government assumed power. With that, the Vichy regime acquired French colonial assets in 
Africa and Southeast Asia. Vietnam, on the periphery of World War Two, was amongst French 
colonial possessions. With authorization from the Vichy government and concurrent to an 
alliance with the Axis powers, Italy and Germany, Japanese forces invaded Vietnam in 
September of 1940. After Japanese forces moved into Vietnam, the Vichy government and 
Japanese military mutually administered Vietnam. In order to feed its military-industrial power, 
Japan bolstered acquisitions  of Southeast Asian rubber, oil, tin, and other resources. Coinciding 
with economic and material necessity, Japan expanded the influence of its Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere, an ideological and political justification for imperialism in Asia. Determined 
to seize power for Asians  from European oppressors, numerous Vietnamese leaders welcomed 
Japan’s  dual governance with Vichy France. Japanese governance of Vietnam placed pro-
Japanese, Vietnamese officials to govern their own people while the Japanese military 
administered from behind. However, due to Japan’s similarly oppressive rule after taking full 
control from the French in 1945, Vietnamese nationalist groups intervened to free their country. 
Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the Viet Minh, worked closely with the American O.S.S. (Office of 
Strategic Services) and the Chinese to undermine Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia. The 
self-determined Vietnamese nationalists claimed independence for Vietnam as the Japanese 
empire fell in August 1945. 
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 Events in Vietnam from 1940-1945 hold a crucial, macro-historical significance and are 
more imperative than the brief independence won by the Viet Minh in September of 1945. 
Numerous factions became involved afterwards including China, the United States, France, and 
various Vietnamese nationalist groups. The interaction of such parties resulted in a series of 
events that would shape Southeast Asia for the proceeding three decades. The origin of 
Vietnamese nationalist groups will provide a more cogent and well-rounded historical 
interpretation. It will also show the extent of Japan’s effect on Vietnamese nationalism. Japanese 
ideology, nationalism, and military methods, as this study conceives, inspired Vietnamese 
liberation movements into the post-colonial period as witnessed by American-European powers 
in their involvement during the Cold War. 
 Despite the lack of clear and straightforward adaptations taken from the Japanese, 
formation of the Viet Minh and actions taken by Ho Chi Minh were in reaction to the dual 
colonial structure of Japanese-occupied Vietnam. In order to stay the tide of Allied victories in 
the Pacific Theater, Japanese aims within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere required 
tapping the sources of Vietnamese nationalism; Japan simultaneously signed their own demise 
by tapping such sources. Japanese occupation had a marked effect on the socio-political climate 
of Vietnam and subsequently determined the course of history for the next thirty years.  
 According to Tran Duc Thao, a Marxist-Vietnamese philosopher, “Japan was at the head 
of renewal for Asia…and took the aggressive form of a new imperialism.”1 Japan had imposed 
its will upon Vietnam politically, economically, and culturally until 1945. Being that they were 
subjugated by the Japanese empire, it can be inferred that some structures influenced the 
Vietnamese.  
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 Many Asians believed that the Japanese, in the early years preceding occupation, would 
deliver the oppressed people from under European hegemony. “Some nationalists had looked for 
help ever since its [Japan’s] victory over Russia in 1905. The Vietnamese patriot Phan Boi Chau, 
who encouraged a number of Vietnamese students to go to Japan, had taught earlier in the 
century that Japan would be the savior who would free Vietnam from the yoke of French 
imperialism.”2 This was true even for members of the Vietnamese royal family, including the 
future nationalist figure Prince Cuong De who was considered for the throne of Vietnam by the 
Japanese occupation administration. While studying in Japan, Cuong De called on his fellow 
countrymen to rise up against the French.3 Previous to and during occupation, a long-standing 
relationship is evident between Vietnam and Japan. Japanese intellectuals and nationalists were 
the obvious counterpart to Vietnamese intellectuals and nationalists. After centuries of Western 
dominance of Asia, Japan, a modernized Asian empire in the mirror image of Western industrial 
might and technology, branded Pan-Asian nationalism as their own and posed as the catalyst for 
other Asian nationalists to retaliate against European imperialism. This is depicted in Brodrick’s 
Little China: The Annamese Lands, by an account of an Englishman questioning Vietnamese 
locals: “In speaking about Japanese ships off the coast of Vietnam, ‘these are built by men like 
ourselves and they say these ships are as good as Europeans, and they belong here.’” Hope and 
positivity characterized Vietnamese moods towards the Japanese. Vietnam considered necessary 
its own self-determination like that of Japan, after a century of French rule. Japan, through 
Vietnamese eyes, was the conduit through which independence could be achieved.  
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 Vietnamese confidence in Japan was recognized internationally. It was understood 
worldwide that Asian nationalists found in Japan a champion against Western domination. In a 
New York Times article titled “Province Sliced from Indochina,” it is revealed that even the 
United States acknowledged the appeal that Japan had in Asia. The article expresses: 
Japan assists Annam [Vietnam] to become independent and will strive completely for her 
expansion as an independent nation and will simultaneously strive to attain results in co-
existence and co-prosperity as a member nation of Greater East Asia in accordance of the 
purpose of the Japanese joint declaration. The Empire of Annam, for purposes of 
attaining these aims, will have faith in the Imperial Government of Japan and will 
cooperate with them.4 
 
The Times article shows the determination of Vietnam to become independent and the Japanese 
government’s commitment to “Asia for Asians.” Conversely, much of the language used in 
Vietnamese and Japanese nationalist circles was similar to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s rhetorical 
“Four Freedoms” in that all nations have a right to self-determination and “freedom from 
tyranny.”5 Considering American depictions of the war and their dehumanizing narrative of their 
enemy in the Pacific, the similarities in rhetorical tools used by both sides is ironic. 
 In accordance with early twentieth century Vietnamese perspectives on the Japanese, 
Japanese sources depict goals of facilitating independence for Asian countries under the auspices 
of the empire. The Japanese crusade was clear-cut support for separation of Southeast Asia from 
the clutches of France, Europe, and the Western powers, whether for strategic necessity or high-
minded reasons. Contemporary Japan, a periodical published in 1937, exemplifies the ideology 
of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in an article titled “The Fundamental Significance 
of Our Continental Policy” when it articulates “the creation of an ideal international relationship 
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for the co-existence and common prosperity for all nations.”6 Even though this article was in 
reference to the Second Sino-Japanese War (1931-1945), language like “co-existence” and 
“common prosperity” no doubt foreshadowed policy for all Asian nations under the influence of 
the Japanese empire and the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.  
 Mamoru Shigemitsu provides a substantial account of the goals of the Japanese empire 
and their subsequent effect on Vietnamese nationalism. From the Manchurian Incident, which 
historians argue sparked the beginning of World War Two (1931) to Japanese surrender in 1945, 
Shigemitsu served as foreign ambassador for Japan in multiple capacities throughout the war.7 In 
his memoir of 1958, Japan and Her Destiny, he not only pens his thoughts and feelings about 
Japan during the war but more specifically, its nationalistic goals within the empire. “My 
contention was that Japan’s war aim was to liberate the Orient.”8 From a Japanese source, the 
objective of the empire was liberation of all Asian nations, particularly severing the stranglehold 
of France from Vietnam. “Japan decided to recognize the sovereignty of nations that had not yet 
achieved independence.”9 By facilitating patriotism and national-feeling within said nations, 
Japan recognized the autonomy of Asia. Japan acknowledged the self-determination of like-
minded, racially similar, linguistically connected people under the dominion of Western 
imperialism. 
 As aforementioned, many Vietnamese nationalists looked to Japan for inspiration and 
tutelage. Shigemitsu continues by saying “From Annam [Vietnam] patriots had flocked to Japan. 
These enlightened leaders were zealous to rescue their people from colonial status.”10 Bao Dai 
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who was supported by the Japanese and will later be discussed and Prince Cuong De who since 
the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 had studied in Japan, were among those “enlightened 
leaders” of Vietnam. These national leaders ignited the flames of nationalism on their return to 
Vietnam, with Japanese guidance. “Japan gave approval to Annam for initiation of their 
independence.”11 Seeking refuge in the support of Japan and its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere, Prince Cuong De and other national figures regarded Japan as the savior of Asia from 
Western hegemony.  
 The Japanese victory over Russia inspired many Asian countries and subsequent, 
infantile nationalist movements, after a century of European control. As a result and as 
mentioned before, Prince Cuong De journeyed to Japan along with many other Vietnamese;12 
under Japanese administration, Cuong De was considered for the throne of Vietnam.13 This is 
congruent with Japanese imperial policy of allowing indigenous leaders to govern their own 
people; a significant change from previous occupiers who installed French colonial 
administrators in lieu of Vietnamese officials.  Japanese official acknowledged the need for 
Vietnamese to govern themselves and promoted local participation in the formation of national 
feeling. This national feeling was one shared by multitudes of Asians who found in common an 
Asian culture, mostly-homogenous race, ideologically bound by Confucianism and the structure 
of society, similar language, and mutual goal of rejected Western incursions. 
  On a parallel trajectory, the Japanese also empathized with Vietnam intellectually and 
politically. Tokyo believed independence could be achieved through the maturation of 
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Vietnamese politics i.e. nationalist activities.14 Essentially, the official Japanese position towards 
the Vietnamese was one of indirect facilitation. This was accomplished through bonds between 
young Japanese diplomats and Vietnamese nationalists in retaliation against European power.15 
Komatsu Kiyoshi, an author in Vietnam, was among these young intellectuals and diplomats. 
Sympathizing with their drive for independence, Komatsu did much to support the efforts of 
various Vietnamese nationalists.16 Japanese intellectuals, like Komatsu, were the natural 
counterparts to Vietnamese intellectuals.17 During the post-French administration, other Japanese 
entities like Kenkyujo (Economic Research Center) were known to assist Vietnamese nationalist 
efforts to establish economic infrastructure.18 Kenkyujo provided places in which nationalists 
could meet safely and often included a Japanese intermediary, like Komatsu, to maintain a 
dialogue with the Japanese military.19 The Vietnamese received invaluable aid from Japanese 
intellectuals and diplomats alike creating a symbiosis in which the two nations interacted 
politically, diplomatically, and economically. The Japanese also enabled Vietnamese nationalism 
on a military level.  
 The empire’s occupation of Southeast Asia and more specifically Vietnam saw the 
application of military structures, tactics, strategy, and organization on the Japanese model. As 
stated, Japanese policy was to liberate colonized Asians from European colonizers and gain local 
groups as allies. This is the case with liberating Vietnam from French oppression. Lebra 
indicates “Guerilla tactics are a legacy attributed to Japanese instruction of Southeast Asian 
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officers.”20 One of the standard tactics utilized by the Japanese was in fact guerilla warfare and 
its application in jungles.21 Coupled with guerilla and jungle warfare, the Japanese inculcated the 
armies of Southeast Asia with a “fighting spirit.”22 The bushido code or “way of the samurai” 
saturated Japanese nationalist rhetoric of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries and its 
values were instilled into the liberated populations of Southeast Asia, Korea, and China.23  
 Evidence of the Japanese military structure influencing Vietnamese nationalist armies is 
irrefutable. The Japanese military clearly supported Vietnamese liberation fronts during the 
occupation. General Tsuchihashi supported the Viet Minh and their efforts to overthrow the 
French colonial government as it fit the overall strategy of Japanese Sittang Meigo Sakusen, or 
coup to overthrow, before Vietnam fell to de Gaulle’s Allied French forces.24  As it dovetailed 
with the overarching Japanese strategy to wrest Vietnam from the grips of France, Tsuchihashi’s 
cooperation with the Viet Minh demonstrated Japanese support for Vietnamese nationalism.  
 Another account from a Colonel Saito in command of a Japanese detachment, called back 
from Burma to capture deserters in Vietnam, revealed that the deserters he was looking for 
instead joined the Viet Minh.25 Japanese soldiers abandoning their posts for the cause of Vietnam  
became a trend by war’s end. Rather than surrender, Japanese troops, defeated and ashamed, 
joined the Vietnamese in their fight for independence.26 Throughout Japanese tenure in Vietnam, 
the military arm of the empire not only carried out the war, but also served as political 
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administrators. In order to carry out Tokyo’s policy of “Asia governed by Asians,” a coup to 
throw out the French was necessary. Thus, Vietnamese nationalists were the appropriate tool in 
fulfilling the obligations of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Colonel Fuchida, 
outlined requirements for the coup’s success in an address to Imperial General Headquarters in 
Tokyo in early 1945: “1) It is necessary to bring a pro-Japanese stance to Vietnam 2) It would be 
difficult to do so without a promise of independence for the people 3) The coup will be a ‘just 
cause’ in the name of the Greater East Asian Community.”27 Fuchida’s wire to Tokyo indicates 
Japanese support for Vietnamese nationalism. Whether the caveat of a coup was intended to 
check the Allied advancement or for the annexation of Vietnam into the Greater East Asia 
Sphere, the Japanese occupation was a catalyst and mobilizer of nationalism in Vietnam. 
Strategic goals of the Japanese empire can also be found with the accounts of Major-General 
Kawamura of the Imperial General Headquarters. For incorporation into the empire and for 
preparation of independence in Vietnam, he ordered a study be undertaken of the popular 
movements within the country.28 Kawamura’s version was substantiated by a French scholar, 
Frederic Roustan. His research emphasizes the use of private and government-sponsored 
Japanese research institutes in the pre-war years and during the war. Dainan Koshi, a private 
think-tank, was contracted for the development of Japanese commercial interests.29 The Japanese 
government also sponsored research into other Asian countries, thereby forming the East Asia 
Common Culture Society. “Members studied a specific topic…for research and data collection… 
then distributed to the Ministries of Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, and the army high 
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command.”30Clearly, in order to perpetuate Pan-Asianism, the Japanese investigated every 
detailed aspect in rallying Asia for Asians. In other words Asia, Vietnam specifically, needed a 
means by which to realize their “nation-ness.” Resentment towards Western hegemony existed, 
but how would nationalists mobilize Vietnam into the physical and mental nation? As stated 
before, independence from European colonial power was a driving force in Southeast Asian 
nationalists support for the Japanese strategy. Prior to World War Two, the Vietnamese studied 
the Japanese and during the war, the Japanese studied to what extent their brand of Asian 
nationalism effected Vietnam. Japan was the means to an end for nationalism in Vietnam.  
 Correspondent to Nitz’s work, Captain Patti Archimedes confirmed the diplomatic and 
political rapport between Japanese and Vietnamese nationalists. Archimedes was an O.S.S. 
(American Office of Strategic Services) operative in Vietnam, during World War Two. “In 
anticipation of the August 1940 takeover of the Vichy government, Tokyo sent ambassador 
Yokoyama, assisted by Komaki Omiya and a Mr. Komatsu.”31 Leading up to the war and during 
its height, Yokoyama was involved in the Japanese research groups entrenched in Vietnam and 
he also served as an advisor to Emperor Bao Dai. Omiya was an official of the Nippon Bunka 
Kaikan (Japanese Cultural Center). Both men had worked through organs sponsored by the 
Japanese government known to cooperate and facilitate Vietnamese nationalist meetings.32 The 
third person, “Mr. Komatsu” is in fact the Japanese literati as alluded to earlier who sympathized 
and aided various Vietnamese nationalists. “Yokoyama’s program was oriented to advancing 
Japanese culture and support for the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere,” and connections 
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to Japanese programs like these fomented a cordial camaraderie with the Vietnamese people.33 
The O.S.S. agent Archimedes’ account verified that pro-Japanese Vietnamese were inspired to 
take back their “Asian-ness” and all the corresponding cultural accoutrement while revolting 
against their European hegemons.34 “As we uncovered complex commercial, political, and 
intelligence apparatus of the Japanese in Indochina, I found cadres in the Phuc Quoc and Dai 
Viet pursuing pro-Japanese programs.”35 There existed a diverse and deep network in which the 
Japanese and Vietnamese interacted to fulfill nationalist goals under the umbrella of the Greater 
East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere and for the self-determination of all Asian nations.  
 There also existed a cause and effect in that Japanese actions propelled Vietnamese 
reaction. By creating a political and military vacuum in Vietnam and humiliating French 
colonialism, the Japanese psychologically motivated Vietnamese nationalism.36 The Japanese 
freed Asia from the vice-grip of European powers as French capitulation raised morale within 
Vietnamese groups. The Japanese “dismantled the French colonial apparatus” and 
simultaneously suppressed anti-communists which allowed easier recruitment for nationalist 
groups.37 By destroying the French colonial hold and spreading Pan-Asianism, Japan laid the 
foundation for independence movements in Vietnam. 
  Other nationalist factions in Vietnam, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao in the Southern half of 
the country, were ideologically inspired by tenets of Catholicism and Buddhism, respectively. 
Unlike other nationalist groups, Cao Dai and Hoa Hao did not possess popular support in that 
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neither appealed to intellectual sensibilities of the urban proletariat.38 Other groups, like the 
Francophiles were large landowners, urban elites, wealthy, and urged collaboration with the 
French.39 As one can deduce, Vietnamese urban working-class and rural peasants were not won 
over by the Francophiles. Enter Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh, from which Japanese 
occupation prompted perhaps the most significant nationalist reaction. Ho promoted an “all-
class” struggle and relied on patriotism to unify Vietnam against French and Japanese 
imperialism.40 The Viet Minh were the only nationalist group to have a solution for their starving 
countrymen after Japanese troops confiscated rice crops in 1944 for the Greater East Asian 
Empire.41 The formation of the Viet Minh and the emergence of Ho Chi Minh were a result of the 
dual-colonial structure of Japanese-Vichy France Vietnam. Occupation by the Japanese had a 
marked effect on the people of Vietnam and as such national feeling materialized. Not all 
Vietnamese nationalists were against the French and hopeful of the Japanese. Some, like the Viet 
Minh, were opposed to anyone not of the Vietnamese nation.  
 Colonel Masanobu Tsuji narrates his memoir in Singapore, The Japanese Version, 
having several parallels to Shigemitsu. Tsuji was highly active with nationalist groups 
throughout Southeast Asia, during World War Two. He was operating in the region until the 
early 1960s and suspected of assisting the North Vietnamese government, even after Japan’s 
surrender on August 15, 1945.42 Tsuji characterizes the ends to which Japan facilitated various 
nationalist groups when he exclaims “With the help of a powerful Japan, the peoples of Asia will 
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work together for independence.”43 In support of self-determination for all Asians, Tsuji 
referenced “a powerful Japan” to oppose the powerful West and its colonial holdings. He 
continued “The aim of the present war is the realization, first in the Far East, of His Majesty’s 
[Emperor Hirohito] august will and ideal that the peoples of the world should each be granted 
possession of their rightful homelands.”44 Rallying against European imperialism and reclaiming 
a homeland represents an appealing and shared feeling for post-colonial, Asian nationalists.  
 Even after Japan’s loss in the Second World War, the Japanese abetted Vietnamese 
nationalism. The case of Masanobu Tsuji is not a singular one. It is estimated that anywhere from 
a few hundred to a few thousand Japanese soldiers, after surrender and having long-term 
emotional and physical ties (families) to Vietnam, stayed and joined various Vietnamese 
nationalist groups. Having been occupiers in the region for no less than five years, Japanese 
troops cohabitated with the indigenous people, had wives and children, and most of all, 
sympathized with Vietnam’s struggle for independence.45 Coincidently, accounts from Vo 
Nguyen Giap, a former history teacher, learned general and tactician, and Ho Chi Minh’s right-
hand-man in revolution, provides primary evidence that some Japanese Imperial soldiers aided 
the Vietnamese in their cause. Speaking about events during the First Indochina War (1946-
1954), General Giap remembered “an old Japanese officer came to our ranks suggesting that we 
set up three lines of defense around Hanoi.”46 This is but one instance of Japanese officers 
training and consulting Vietnamese revolutionaries. Other nationalist groups enjoyed explicit 
guidance from Japanese officers on fighting for home and hearth, including the Dai Viet. 
                                                 
43
 Masanobu Tsuji, Singapore, The Japanese Version (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1961), 304. 
44
 Tsuji, 305. 
45
 Louis Allen, War, Conflict, and Security in Japan and Asia Pacific 1941-1952 (Folkestone, Kent, U.K.: Global 
Oriental, 2011), 42. 
46




 Vietnamese accounts confirm Japanese aid to the cause of national self-determination. 
“The Japanese sponsored the unification of Dai Viet formations in Vietnam and created the Tan 
Viet Nam Dang (New Vietnam Party) in Central Vietnam.”47 “Japanese occupation helped 
revitalize various anti-French movements in Vietnam…[the] Japanese encouraged all political 
groups.”48 Later Vietnamese scholars, unlike their ultra-Marxist predecessors, recognized the 
significance of the Japanese variety of nationalism on shaping Vietnamese nationalism. 
 Bui Diem was a Vietnamese student and clandestine member of the Dai Viet non-
communist, nationalist party during Japanese occupation. During the war he worked alongside 
Japanese cohorts against the French and coincidently studied under Vo Nguyen Giap in college 
while active in the Vietnamese nationalist movement.49 Bui was molded by and represented the 
relationship between Japanese and Vietnamese nationalists. “The Dai Viet party I had joined had 
close ties to the Japanese.”50 A fellow Japanese student, Yamaguchi, was a known Japanese 
operative and a frequent visitor to Bui’s uncle, Tran Trong Kim.51 Tran Trong Kim was later 
chosen as Prime Minister to Bao Dai, the Japanese-endorsed emperor of Vietnam. Bui speaks 
about students involved with the Dai Viet party as “most of them knew Yamaguchi at least 
slightly, he had been enrolled at the university for years and had been so active on the Japan-
Vietnam friendship front.”52 Yamaguchi was likely involved with research and cultural groups 
sponsored by the Japanese government and also a potential Nakano agent. Digressing from Bui, 
the Nakano School was within the purview of the military and a secret intelligence organization. 
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It was founded in July of 1938 for espionage purposes against the Soviet Union.53 In order to 
train the populace in military tactics, particularly in guerilla warfare and subversion, graduates of 
the Nakano School were planted within Greater East Asian countries.54 Embedded in Vietnam 
during the Second World War, Captain Kaneko, a Nakano graduate, was charged with 
implementing Japanese strategy to undermine French rule via Vietnamese nationalist groups. His 
mission included releasing Bao Dai from incarceration from French authorities. Later, as the 
Japanese mission was a success, Bao Dai was selected by the military administration as emperor 
to the newly liberated Vietnamese nation.55 This is but one example of a Nakano agent aiding 
indigenous nationalists in overthrowing their Western tormentors.  
 Accounts like Yamaguchi and Kaneko are congruent with the many ways in which 
Vietnamese nationalists maintained open communication and collaboration with Japanese 
counterparts. In The Jaws of History, Bui addresses indigenous celebrations of ancestors in 
Vietnam. Due to their incitement of patriotism, cultural celebrations were banned by the French 
government. Bui recollects that there was no “explicit prohibition from the Japanese and the 
student association [Dai Viet] went all out.”56 Unlike French colonialism, the Japanese 
occupation did not censure patriotic feeling or culturally significant events, but in fact 
encouraged them.  
 As stated before, there were several national, Japanese-educated, Vietnamese figures that 
were groomed and supported by the Japanese government. They were placed in power due to 
their sympathies towards Japanese guidance and enjoyed the direct sponsorship of Japanese 
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officials. Previously alluded to, Bao Dai was the recipient of such support from the Japanese in 
his pursuit for independence of Vietnam. Tran Trong Kim, as Bui learned from Yamaguchi, was 
given asylum in Singapore by the Japanese and returned to Vietnam because “Bao Dai, 
Vietnam’s Emperor, had asked him to form a new government.”57 Various nationalist figures of 
importance had been protected by the Japanese from French detainment. Coinciding with 
Tokyo’s policy of allowing Asia to be governed by Asians, Vietnamese leaders were key in 
promoting nationalism and self-determination within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere. “Emperor Bao Dai, encouraged by the Japanese, declared Vietnam independent and 
formed a national government.”58 Bui’s uncle, Tran Trong Kim was inevitably appointed Prime 
Minister to the Bao Dai government.59 In an interview with Le Monde, after World War Two, 
Bao Dai was questioned by French journalists. Through the course of the interview, Bao Dai 
affirmed “they [Japanese] gave us our independence which was the first thing.”60 Coming 
directly from a key source, it is explicitly evident that the Japanese expedited the emancipation 
of Vietnam from French colonialism. 
 In relation to Bao Dai and Tran Trong Kim’s appointment by the Japanese, other leaders 
were also favored by their occupiers. Anyone who is familiar with the American Vietnam War 
knows the name Ngo Dinh Diem. Diem was held on retainer by the Japanese for purposes 
similar to Tran Trong Kim and Bao Dai. Bui Diem continues: “It was a surprise to a real 
politician [Ngo Dinh Diem] who had kept himself close to the Japanese all along. Shortly before 
the coup against the French [Meigo Sittang Sakusen], the Japanese had flown Kim from 
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Singapore to Saigon. Ngo Dinh Diem was also in Saigon and both kept constant contact with the 
Japanese.”61 
By protecting and inserting nationalist leaders after power was wrested from the French, the 
Japanese counted on these leaders to perpetuate the common national feeling between Japan and 
Vietnam. “The Japanese had been keeping both men available [Kim and Diem] pending their 
reading of the situation.”62 Catering to perceptions of the urban elite class, both Diem and Kim 
were believed to be the best representation of the Vietnamese people and harbored the most 
support from the Japanese. To fit their strategy of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 
and to ensure Vietnamese independence, the Japanese backed notables like Kim, Bao Dai, and 
Diem. 
 Similar to Vo Nguyen Giap’s account of Japanese officers training the Viet Minh, Bui 
also revealed that “the military instructors at this camp turned out to be Japanese.”63 Just as 
Japanese officers trained guerillas of the Viet Minh, so too did they educate the ranks of Bui’s 
Dai Viet party. As discussed by scholars like Lebra, Allen, and Nitz, many Vietnamese guerillas 
and soldiers gleaned fighting methods and tactics from the Japanese military model. 
Additionally, jungle warfare was a specialty and of particular focus by graduates of the Nakano 
School, of which many agents divulged to the Vietnamese their knowledge. Primary sources like 
Bui and Giap confirm that the Japanese, through its military training, assisted and molded 
Vietnamese freedom-fighters during World War Two. As such, scores of Japanese soldiers 
worked for the nationalist parties.64 More specifically, a Japanese colonel, who had taken a 
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Vietnamese name, “Hung,” stated to a group of Dai Viet recruits “with our help [Japanese], you 
will become Vietnamese samurai.”65 Politically, socially, intellectually, militarily, ideologically, 
the Japanese occupation of Vietnam served as the catalyst for nationalism, so much so that after 
surrender, the Japanese joined their Vietnamese counterparts in the struggle for nationhood. 
“Colonel Hung’s” words to his Vietnamese students embody the entirety of the Japanese mission 
in Asia.  
 In conclusion, Japanese ideology and Pan-Asian nationalism shaped, improved, and 
instructed Vietnamese nationalism in conjunction with previously existing, indigenous 
patriotism. Vietnamese nationalism found cohesion and direction in the struggle against French 
oppression and for the liberation of its people through various research institutes implanted by 
the Japanese. Japan’s occupation provided a framework for the Vietnamese to see themselves as 
a nation and the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere offered a channel for which self-
determination of the Vietnamese people could be realized. Asian nationalism, including that of 
Vietnam, looked to Japan as a beacon of hope, ever since their victory over Russia in 1905. 
Japanese nationalism formed a unified vision of an Asian continent governed by Asians and 
inspired by the patriotic words of the Emperor. Japan encouraged the political development and 
evolution of nationalist parties by protecting Vietnamese leaders from French incarceration. Bao 
Dai’s sponsorship and elevation to the throne symbolized Japanese support for Vietnam 
governed by Vietnamese. Militarily, the French (1946-1954) and Americans (1964-1973) 
witnessed the guerilla tactics adopted by Vietnamese soldiers. Vietnamese armies inherited a 
military structure influenced by the principals of the bushido code (justice, courage, 
benevolence, politeness, veracity, honor, and loyalty) and jungle warfare tactics from the Nakano 
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School. Ideologically, liberation from Western dominance was expressed through ardent 
patriotism that Japanese and Vietnamese exhibited in common. The historical significance of the 
Japanese occupation 1940-1945 is valuable in that it depicts an obscure and often ignored 
narrative of World War Two. It also sets the stage for the next three decades of international geo-




Pan-Asianism’s Failure and Legacy After 1945 
 Japanese nation-building worked for Japan. Under the Tokugawa shogunate and 
hegemony of the samurai class over Japanese society, the “nation” of Japan did not really exist. 
Pre-modern Japan culminated into a group of provinces independently ruled by warlords from 
the eighth century to the mid-nineteenth century. Essentially landowners claimed individual 
sovereignty over all they acquired via conquest of other landowners. Additionally, daimyo 
employed samurai to fight for them against neighboring daimyo; With that, samurai were not 
conscripted, citizen soldiers belonging to a centralized state. During Japan’s feudal era, no 
iteration of nation-ness existed as we know in Western scholarship. Unlike modern Japan, pre-
modern Japan was governed by both the emperor and shogun and no centralized power 
controlled the citizens. The emperor presided over social, religious, and ceremonial affairs and 
the shogun administered the military, various daimyo, and collected taxes. Coincidingly, there 
were no citizens that identified as Japanese but merely politically associated with their domicile 
province or lord under which they served. The people knew that they belonged to the land on 
which they farmed or conducted business. However, socially, linguistically, ethnically, and 
religiously the Japanese people were connected. Social customs, derived from Confucianism, 
were commonly accepted. Being an island country, there was little variation of dialects within 
their language, like in China. Ethnically, most Japanese were, and still are, descendent from 
Chinese and Korean immigrants to the island, mixed with some of the indigenous Ainu people. 
Also, on a religious and descendance note, most Japanese people believed the emperor 
descended from the Shinto sun-goddess Amaterasu. From this, pre-modern Japan required a 
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centralized state to become a nation. Many of the parts, as we reference in Western taxonomy of 
nations, were present. But national characteristics were needed.   
 Beginning with the Meiji Restoration, Japan, like no other East Asian country, was forced 
to open its borders for trade with the West in 1858. With that, it also adopted Western methods 
of industrialization, economics, centralized government, and education systems. Adoption of 
these methods catalyzed the Japanese nation. It provided for a strong, centralized state to 
administer its citizens. Industrialization provided opportunities for society to shift from rural to 
urban as jobs went from agriculture to machinery. The migration of people from rural to urban 
areas created a notion of one-ness. Economically, standards of living rose simultaneously with 
industrialization. Basic education became universal and was used as the state’s tool to “produce” 
like-minded citizens for perpetuity and to ensure the burgeoning, national narrative. By 
educating obedient citizens, the state also created a population from which to conscript soldiers. 
Modernity spelled the end of the samurai class as ordinary citizens became wealthy, educated, 
conscripted, and upwardly-mobile.   
 However, the samurai, certainly the reimagined form, remained useful for the Japanese 
state’s purposes. The newly formed nation was propagated on “old” structures. With modernity, 
every Japanese was enabled to become a samurai. As previously addressed, the state reified 
history to mobilize the Japanese nation economically, politically, socially, religiously, 
linguistically, and militarily. Japanese companies, particularly those associated with the 
Zaibatsu, bore samurai names. Japanese politicians demanded undying loyalty and governed as 
daimyo. Despite Western-style democratization, Confucian society still required an ordered 
society. In modern Japan, the emperor was still revered as the descendant of Amaterasu on earth. 
Linguistically and rhetorically, the seven tenents of bushido were utilized in every facet of 
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Japanese life. Militarily, Japanese battleships were monikered by ancient samurai names, officers 
carried katana, and surrender meant death and shame for conscripted soldiers. Japan mimicked 
Western models, but in so doing invented their own national form. All ingredients presented 
themselves as Japan joined the “old” with the “new.”  
 Japan assumed a leadership role in East Asia and as a Confucian-based society, its 
nationalizing mission turned towards its neighbors. It transferred its social basis onto a national 
one and viewed other countries as existing within their differential circle of associations. For a 
moment, engage this example: China was the centralized power of Asia for millennia, a sort of 
socio-cultural parent or elder. Newly-modernized Japan considered itself as an offspring of 
China. As China grew old and was “picked” apart by Western powers, it lost its sense of heritage 
and social origin. Being a Confucian nation also and believing it to be China’s offspring, Japan 
endeavored to assist its aging elder through educational exchange, preservation of fundamentally 
East Asian origins, like Qufu and Nanjing, and re-introducing it to China through transnational 
means. Japanese nationalism spawned Pan-Asianism as it attempted to reinterpret deeply-rooted 
East Asian traditions within a modern context. However, it proved impossible for Japanese 
nationalism and Pan-Asianism to succeed in other Asian countries. The atrocities committed by 
the Japanese in China and Vietnam can not be overlooked. Slaughtering 300,000 Chinese, just in 
Nanjing, and starving millions of Vietnamese through seizure of rice supplies did not convince 
Japan’s Asian neighbors to align with their transnational mission.  
 Assessment of Wang Jingwei’s government, its adoption and acceptance of Japanese 
Pan-Asianism, is historically significant to the field. It provides a case study for the Pan-Asian 
movement. First, this work provides analysis from a transnational lens by employing sources 
from numerous and varied nations. Instead of a single perspective, it examines the topic from 
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multiple facets, not only Japanese or Chinese, but American, British, and French. Moreover, this 
analysis is generations removed from the events in which it addresses and is not subject to 
immediate biases that previous scholarship exhibited. From a transnational lens, this is an 
objective interpretation of Wang Jingwei and the Reorganized National Government’s role and 
various Vietnamese parties during the Asia-Pacific War 1937-1945.  
 Secondly important is the obscurity of Wang Jingwei in historical accounts. The 
nationalist movements of Mao Zedong and Jiang Jieshi dominated scholarly narration. This is 
attributable to the continuation of the Chinese civil war after 1945 and the importance of Cold 
War (1947-1991) geo-politics. The CCP’s victory in 1949 over the Guomindang garnered more 
attention by historians than did Wang Jingwei’s failed government. In Chinese accounts, from 
both the CCP and Guomindang, the Reorganized National Government is labeled as treasonous 
and as collaborators. However, over seventy years later, interpretations change. Value and moral 
judgement of historical accounts is less probable the further it is removed from the event. As 
mentioned before, this work attempts to shift the historiographical trajectory of Wang Jingwei’s 
government and Pan-Asianism, not in an effort of apology towards Japan, but to provide a more 
“rounded” depiction of events. Often, history is written by the “victors” and this is true in this 
instance.  
 Japanese transnationalism failed in China for multiple reasons. Simply stated, forces 
conflicted in a dialectic that divided Chinese nationalists during World War Two. Mao Zedong 
and Jiang Jieshi resisted Japanese occupation; Wang Jingwei and Japan tried to revitalize China 
within the Greater East Asia Sphere. Two sides held different aspirations for China’s direction. 
To specify Japan’s failed transnational endeavors, one must address similarities and differences 
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with China. The latter was the cultural forebearer of Japan and East Asia. Both societies were 
rooted in Confucianism.  
 Nonetheless, China and Japan experienced different historical developments which made 
supplanted Pan-Asianism unattainable. Geographically, China is much larger than the Japanese 
islands and had a significantly larger population. The expanse of China and volume of people 
alone made any nationalist dialogue impossible. For argument’s sake, any re-imagining of a 
Chinese past for nationalist purposes was unachievable because “Chinese-ness” was defined 
differently in the north than it was in the south. Unifying economic, political, social, religious, 
linguistic, or ethnic factors were disconcerted throughout the various regions of China. No matter 
the extent to which Japanese intellectuals portrayed Pan-Asia as uniform, China was too large, in 
differing historical circumstances, and too internally diverse to fall within a Greater East Asian 
Sphere.  
 Economically and infrastructurally, China differed from Japan as well. As the twentieth 
century commenced, Japan was industrialized, urban, and modernized. China remained under 
Qing feudal rule, was rural, and not yet industrialized. Nationalist narratives spread via an 
educated populace and obedient citizens who believe they belong to the same “thing.” Without 
an industrial base, universal education, centralized state, commonly accepted religion, and 
commonly understood language, China could not have entered the Pan-Asian fold. Wang 
Jingwei was Japanese educated, politically prominent, and an urban elite. Most of China was un-
educated, illiterate, and rural farmers. Any form of nationalism, unless backed by totalitarian 
force, could not have unified China under such circumstances. Despite Chinese Communism’s 
victory in 1949, the power structure that it imposed was not so different from the oppression of 
Qing rule. Wang Jingwei’s Japanese-backed government, pragmatic as it was, could not have 
69 
 
accomplished Chinese national consolidation. With that, the same historical circumstances that 
were present in mid-nineteenth century Japan were not present in mid-twentieth century China. 
Japanese nationalism worked in Japan, but as Japan attempted to spread its brand of state-
building, transnationally, it was not entirely effective.  
There is a similar case in Vietnam in which Communists and other nationalist movements 
collided to unite a nation under the thumb of colonialism. Vietnam was also occupied by Japan, 
beginning in 1940. Until March 1945, Japan co-governed with Vichy France. However, in the 
name of Pan-Asianism and liberating Asian peoples from Western colonialism, Japanese forces 
usurped total control of Vietnam. As mentioned before, Japan engaged its neighbors in 
educational exchange and an amiable relationship between Japanese and Vietnamese nationalists 
emerged. Vietnamese nationalist groups like the Dai Viet party enjoyed support from Japanese 
advisors, much like Wang Jingwei. Even Viet Minh guerilla forces received training from 
Japanese officers before and after war’s end.1 After taking control of the country, Japan placed 
Bao Dai as emperor of Vietnam with Ngo Dinh Diem in his cabinet. Both admired Japan for its 
modern nation-state and the Japanese believed them to be aligned with Pan-Asianism and the 
liberation of Asians from Western colonialism.2 The Viet Minh eventually gained the Vietnamese 
people’s support and control of the country, after Japan was defeated.  
Vietnam also experienced different historical circumstances than Japan, despite cultural, 
religious, ideological, and social similarities. For one thousand years, Vietnam and Southeast 
Asia struggled with colonialism from China to the North, India from the West, Japan from the 
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East, and finally France beginning in the seventeenth century. Vietnam’s history was wrought 
with intrusive powers attempting to change its culture, people, language, and beliefs. However, 
leading up to the 1940s, Japanese and Vietnamese intellectuals and social elites found 
commonalities in Confucian social structures, religious beliefs, and rhetoric through educational 
exchange. Like many other East Asian countries during the early twentieth century, Vietnam 
looked to Japan as the arbiter of modernity, post-colonialism, and state-building. Conversely and 
despite material desires in Southeast Asia, Japan looked to Vietnam as a member Pan-Asia that 
coincided with its transnational crusade against the West.  
Despite cultural-educational exchange and seemingly parallel beliefs between the two 
countries, Japan and Vietnam only had an enemy, the West, in common. As previously 
mentioned, Vietnam underwent numerous foreign incursions that changed its national landscape. 
Japan had no contact with the world from 1603 to 1856 which allowed for an organic, national, 
homogenization. Given Vietnam’s foreign intrusions, its people were dynamic and its feeling of 
“one-ness” never formed like in isolated Japan. Vietnam’s component within Pan-Asia existed 
only in the minds of intellectuals; an urban, educated, social elite that constituted a minority in 
the country. The Dai Viet did not represent the majority of Vietnam and Ho Chi Minh exploited 
this. Ho’s Viet Minh aroused Vietnam’s majority rural population. His tool was communism, but 
his motive was national self-determination. Because of Vietnam’s varied history, it could not 
have conformed to Japan’s transnational Pan-Asia without continued oppression from foreign 
powers. Additionally, like Japanese atrocities committed in China, Japanese forces confiscated 
rice supplies from the Vietnamese population, leaving millions to starve. Ho Chi Minh gained 
support after recovering stolen rice and distributing it to the Vietnamese people. After the 
Second World War, France and the United States both faced strong nationalist fronts from 1946-
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1954 and 1964-1973 respectively. Despite the Greater East Asia Sphere’s failure, the Viet Minh 
adopted Pan-Asianism’s liberation aspect and combatted Western incursions.  
 Pan-Asianism ultimately failed and “died” with Japan’s defeat in 1945. Nonetheless, the 
legacy of the Pan-Asian narrative remained well after World War Two and affected a multitude 
of Asian nations colonized by Western oppressors. Pan-Asianism did not survive as Japanese 
architects formulated, but in the form of post-colonial movements. There were numerous wars 
between Western powers and Asian colonies, seeking self-determination. During the Cold War, 
France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States all encountered significant 
nationalist resistance where ever they had a colonial presence or foothold. The “hottest” conflicts 
of the Cold War were waged over former colonies seeking independence. The Korean War 
(1950-1953) involved two nationalist movements at odds, between North and South. After 
decades of Japanese colonialism (1910-1945), Koreans were undoubtedly influenced by 
Japanese nationalism and Pan-Asianism. Syngman Rhee, president of South Korea (1948-1960) 
was educated in Japan. High ranking generals in the South Korean military were trained at 
Japanese military academies. Influential South Korean political and military leaders alike 
admired the construction of the Japanese nation-state, and partially borrowed from and admired 
Pan-Asian concepts.3   
 These few cases exemplify a lingering legacy that Japanese Pan-Asianism affected. 
Although Japan and its cohorts failed, ideas of East Asian self-determination succeeded. 
Japanese influence initiated irreversible movements against Western power. It fostered a 
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dialogue of indigenous nationalism and for Asian peoples to embrace their past while joining 
with modernity. Japan showed its East Asian neighbors that nations could be formed by 
combining the “old” with the “new.”  Since Japan emerged victorious over a European power in 
the Russo-Japanese War (1905), Asian nations including Vietnam, China, Korea, Malaysia, and 
India looked to Japan as a beacon of hope. Subsequently, during the Second World War, in order 
to fulfill their long-term strategic goals of opposition against the West, Japan formed a cohesive 
vision of an Asian continent governed by Asians and inspired by the nationalistic words of the 
Emperor. Japanese ideology and Pan-Asian nationalism shaped, improved, and instructed Asian 
nationalist movements in conjunction with previously existing, indigenous patriotism. Pan-
Asianism found cohesion and direction in the struggle against Western oppression and for the 
liberation of its people through various research institutes implanted by the Japanese. Japan’s 
occupation provided a framework for their neighbors to see themselves as a nation and the 
Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere offered a channel for which self-determination of Asian 
peoples could be realized. Japan encouraged the political development and evolution of 
nationalist parties by protecting indigenous leaders from Western incarceration. East Asian 
national armies inherited a military structure influenced by the principals of the bushido code 
(justice, courage, benevolence, politeness, veracity, honor, and loyalty) and jungle warfare 
tactics from Japanese officers.4 
In conclusion, Japan acted as the channel through which Pan-Asian nationalism took root 
and was realized in a post-colonial world. From a functional standpoint, Japan established 
schools, infrastructure, manufacturing, banking, and militaries wherever it colonized. This 
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allowed the colonized the means to mobilize for their own national movements. Japan’s ignition 
of the nationalist “cannon” was witnessed during the Cold War as Western powers bore the brunt 
of Pan-Asian nationalism in their futile attempts to grasp their depleting colonial holdings in East 
Asia. The Japanese occupation of China and Vietnam affected many aspects of nationalism. 
Military, cultural, societal, intellectual, and ideological models from Japan all served to instruct 
China and Vietnam on Pan-Asian nationalism and unify against the West. Those same models 
were residual and evident well after Japanese troops withdrew from their occupied territories. 
The Japanese occupation of East Asia set into motion a nationalist trend, one unique to East Asia 
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